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ABSTRACT

This publication contains 12 papers presented at the 28th annual meeting of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society. A wide variety of topics is discussed. For example, one paper titled "Democracy, Models, and a Paradigm for Internship," discusses the functions of educational administration. The theme of manipulation is examined in a paper titled "The Self Undercut by Power." Philosophical perspectives concerning contemporary issues in education are examined. The content-construct validity distinction in educational test theory is treated. The salient elements of Yves Simon's position on moral development are discussed. One paper deals with pictorial depiction and visual correspondence. Another deals with the crises in our public schools today. The question "Are American models applicable to Canadian sociology or should we have a Canadian sociology of education?" is examined. Topics of other papers include accountability, moral foundations and modern education, alternative models of cultural pluralism, and failure. An author's index concludes the proceedings. (Author/RM)

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PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
1980

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE FAR WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

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PREFACE

The Society which scorns excellence in plumbing because it is a humble activity and tolerates shoddiness in philosophy because it is an exhaulted activity will have neither good plumbing nor good philosophy. Neither its pipes nor its theories will hold water.

We of the Far West Philosophy of Education Society foster excellence in the field of philosophy and recognize its paramount importance in any educational pursuit.

Yours professionally,

Dr. Earl L. Grossen
June, 1981

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CHAPTER 1.

DEMOCRACY, MODELS, AND A PARDIGM FOR INTERNSHIP

Part II. Educational Administration: Generic Functions and a Model for Articulation

R. BLAKE, T. F. SAUNDERS, J. ENGLE, C. DECKER

Prologue

Part I of this paper addressed this question of democratic participation in both private and public sector functions in our society. The different levels of participation identified in that presentation emphasized the need for specialist participation wherever the context was of sufficient importance, i.e., had extensive impact on the judgments involved, to warrant more than mere permissiveness in choice. The seven principles outlined at the end of the paper set minimum parameters for knowing when expert judgment is advisable.

Introduction

Part II of this paper, presented here, extends these principles to include some criteria for specifying the generic functions of educational administration, and to propose a model in which these generic functions can be cross-referenced with different levels of administrative responsibilities.

Defining the functions of educational administrators has been a pursuit of administrators, practitioners, philosophers, and theoreticians of educational administration for such a long period of time that it well may run as an educational parallel likened to King Arthur and his knights search for the holy grail. The approaches used by these inquirers to agree on the specific functions have been equally as numerous as the listings of functions that have been generated.

For example Harlow (1), writing in 1963, stated:

> Efforts to describe and define the role of the administrator, whether he be department chairman, principal, superintendent, college dean, or college president, industrial executive or military officer, have proliferated during the past fifteen years. Insofar as the educational administrator has been described, his role clearly encompasses many things.

Harlow does not attempt to produce a listing of these "many things" that administrators do, but deftly and unequivocably he points out that no function stands out more clearly than "...the function of seeing that the purposes of the enterprise are accurately and explicitly defined, and effectively held up for view by the group." (underlining mine) Hawlow assumes a comprehensive, available list of described purposes and definitions. No such list is agreed upon by administrators. There is a kind of "pooled ignorance" at work in Harlow's comment. Yet, it can be said also that many administrators believe that structure follows function, i.e., that an administrative function emerges from a reaction to questions and problems. This position is in contrast to a more philosophically determined sequence where the nursing, planning, activities, and evaluations or accountability components are pre-established and structured to sort or classify any functions that may emerge from short- or long-range demands for administrative operations.

Other writers have arrived at listings of functions by such devices as the Delphi technique; brainstorming; Likert scale questionnaires; and interviews, with or without "probing questions."

We could question the need to catalogue the functions that an administrator does in the first place. A major reason given historically for locating and elaborating upon administrative functions, by professors of educational administration and professors of related disciplines in colleges and universities, has been for the purpose of designing preparation programs for school administrators. The idea assumes that if we define, describe, and otherwise explain what it is that administrators do, then we can codify a curriculum accordingly. Then these functions may be taught.

A more recent, but hardly a unique or surprising development on the educational preparation scene, has been the call for "competency based" administrator preparation programs. Thus, the interrelationship of the functions to be performed and the "degree of success" with which the functions are performed, that is, can be evaluated, adds another dimension of purpose for institutions of higher education.

The "competency-based" movement, which may be considered either a part of or parallel to the equally nebulous concept of "accountability," has appeared in the elementary and secondary schools of the nation. This competency based movement translates into a kind of evaluation. On the one hand, competency based evaluation requests have resulted in more rigorous attention to administrative job descriptions. On the other hand, the application of the "management by objectives" concept, invented by Peter Drucker (2) some twenty years ago, to the enterprise of educational administration has come to fruition in a variety of evaluation programs.

Thus it appears that a model is needed which has the capability to interrelate the functions of educational administration with the evaluation of those functions. In the section that follows such a model will be developed.

Generic functions have been discussed by many authors. This section will examine and analyze the kinds and types of functions that have been ascribed to educational administrators. These functions obviously have the merit of having been generated and recorded out of the experiences and conventional wisdom of administrators and theoreticians alike. A review of some of the more prominent and classic categories of administrative functions found in the literature of management and educational administration will set the basis for an examination of current trends in the categories of functions which appear in evaluation systems for administrators. These categories of administrative functions in administrative evaluation systems can then be sorted and reordered to establish some of the parallels that pertain between the categories.

ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION CATEGORIES: A Review and Comments

The review of some of the lists of administrative functions will provide illustrations of categories usually included in such lists and also provide an opportunity to suggest some criteria by which such listing can be held accountable.

Henri Fayol in 1916 (3) proposed a listing of management categories which he described as "elements of management." Fayol's elements of management are what might be called generic or subject matter neutral. That is, his functions should fit any administrative position, in a sense, administration qua administration.

His list of functions are as follows:

1) Planning
2) Organizing
3) Directing
4) Coordinating
5) Controlling
6) Stimulating

Functions one through five are characteristic of discussions of management. However the sixth function, "Stimulating," taken here to mean motivating, is a more universally accepted category in the discourse of Psychology. Fayol has committed a universe of discourse error, a fallacy which could lead a training program astray in addition to rendering the list itself unaccountable. The criteria used to assess and sequence activities for the first five categories are different in type from the criteria used by psychologists to assess a stimulating activity.

A further criticism of Fayol's list of categories arises when the Organizing and Coordinating are seen as similar functions. There are level differences here in that items (1), (3), and (5) are overarching, while (2) and (4) are mid-range or on occasion substantive.

Gulick and Urwick, adapting Fayol's analysis of management functions, arrived at seven major functions in their work in 1937. (4) Their listing of functions in addition to Fayol's were:

- Staffing
- Reporting
- Budgeting

Budgeting is not the same as the other categories. This list again combines generic categories with the specific substantive categories with the specific substantive categories of staffing and reporting. Again the function has determined the list and not a present model for planning for needs.

Turning now to functions produced by educators who attempt to investigate more substantive types of functions performed by educational administrators, a decided switch in types of categories occurs.

Campbell, Bridges, et al., achieve a degree of parsimony in their listing by reducing major administrative functions to the following six.

1. School Community Relations
2. Curriculum and Instruction
3. Pupil Personnel
4. Staff Personnel
5. Physical Facilities
6. Finance and Business Management

It should be noted that all of the above categories are of the same type, i.e., meet the criterion of categorical consistency where they all subset under educational administration. The listing produced here represents a typical listing of courses offered by most departments of educational administration to satisfy degree or administrative certification requirements. (7) The only point of non-agreement between this listing and that produced by the Southern States Project is the functional area of School Transportation which is included in the former, but not in the latter, list.

A listing of functions developed by Kimbrough and Nunnery in 1976 serves to provide some categories which have not yet been mentioned by the above authors. This function is one of "Evaluation, Research, and Accountability."

The function of "Evaluation, Research and Accountability," listed along with substantive functions of administration poses a problem of categorical consistency. If one reason for developing a listing of functions is to determine what and how well administrators perform their functions, then administrators must be evaluated as well as be evaluators. Whatever the reason or the fallacy committed, it is crucial that this function be performed if the concept of accountability, the value pervasive that initiates the quest for administrative competence, is to be operationalized.

This category of evaluation can be explicated by reviewing some examples of the categories currently being used to evaluate educational administrators. This review will provide the necessary data to develop a model for relating administrative functions to the categories used to evaluate administrators.

ADMINISTRATOR EVALUATION CATEGORIES

There are some parallels between the listings of administrative functions and the categories which have been developed to evaluate administrators. The example below taken from an elementary school in Arizona serves to locate three categories which have been indicated above:

A. Organization/Management

B. Instruction--Curriculum

C. Personal Characteristics

D. Human Relations

E. Professional Behavior and Knowledge. (10)

This list sets criteria from different levels and from different areas of study in an incompatible combination. This iteration of category fallacies and categorical consistency is intended to maintain a focus with the loss of meaningful planning which must emerge when criteria from psychological categories are used in the same plan as criteria used to judge organizational management.

6.

A set of administrative "criteria" developed to evaluate a superintendent of schools again provides three familiar types of functions:

1. Relationships with Board
2. Community Relationships
3. Staff and Personnel Relationships
4. Educational Leadership
5. Business and Finance
6. Personal Qualities. (11)

Community Relationships, Staff and Personal Relationships and Business and Finance functions do characterize the substantive field of administration. Note also, however, that Relationships with Board and Educational Leadership, both "non" functions, arise to confuse the issue of evaluation.

The non-functional category of Educational Leadership appears often in evaluation categories produced in school systems. The usual way to utilize this category in evaluation is to make it operationally meaningful by attaching some specific responsibilities to it.

An interesting set of evaluation categories developed by an Arizona school district for administrators sets the following categories and criteria:

A. Educational Leadership
    1. Curriculum and/or Program Planning and Development
    2. Curriculum and/or Program Implementation
    3. Curriculum and/or Program Evaluation
    4. Encourages In-service Education and Staff Professional Growth
B. Communication Ability
    1. Community Relations
    2. Internal Relations
    3. Administrative Relations
C. Management Ability
    2. Decision Making
    3. Budget Preparation and Management

The solution to the problem of too many categories appears to be somewhat straightforward. First, find a model structure which is capable of handling a complex set of interrelated functions. Then, develop a syntax which is compatible with the model. Saunders' "Cube of Inquiry" model (13) has been previously adapted to separate Institutional functions from Administrative functions for purposes of illustrating cases of relationships which exhibit some of the same characteristics as those questions addressed in this section. (14)

A further adaptation of Saunders' model was done by Blake (7) in designing a format for examining the types of functions typically found in administrative internship programs. A model for showing interrelationships between different types of functions starts by arranging substantive administrative functions into four basic categories and adds an Evaluation category as a pervasive component of these four as shown in Figure 1 below:

Figure 1. Substantive Administrative Functions

Instruction	Staff Development	Student Services	Support Services	Evaluation

The non-generic categories of administrative functions such as those developed by Fayol, Gulick and Urwick, and other writers who include Evaluation, may be added:

Figure 2. Generic Admin. Functions

Policy and Planning
Coordinating and Developing
Supervising and Implementing
Evaluation

Combining the two sets of functions, generic and non-generic, and labeling them respectively, administrative and institutional functions, for purposes of showing what administrators, at what level they have responsibility, and how they can be evaluated, can all be cross-referenced in the model below:

D. Professional Growth and Development

1. Knowledgeable in his Field. (12)

These categories and criteria are not operationally stated and combine a range of skill areas that precludes any clear evaluation at any time. "Leadership," "ability," are rather different from evaluation functions to be performed by the administrator. There are significant differences in a training program which could be devised to teach an administrator in decision-making and communication skills.

A MODEL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS AND EVALUATION CATEGORIES

If all of the non-repetitive generic and non-generic categories of administrative functions and evaluation were laid "end-to-end" as it were, they would go on forever. The lists do however include some categories which, for whatever reason, continue to occur on all lists. Those that do not survive as common items can be conveniently ignored. The following list exemplifies some different kinds of categories*:

☐ Planning

☐ Organizing

· Curriculum and Instruction

· Community Relations

· Business Affairs

☐ Coordinating

· Student Personnel

· Staff Personnel

☐ Policy (as shown in Board/Administrator Relations)

☐ Directing (taken to mean Supervisory)

· Staff Development

· Physical Plant

· Transportation

---

* ☐ Indicates general functions (Adminstration qua Adminstration)

· Indicates non-generic or specific functions

Figure 3. A Model for Adminstrative Functions

Institutional Function / Admin. Functions	Instruction	Staff Development	Student Service	Support Service	Evaluation
Policy and Planning					
Coordinating and Developing					
Supervising and Implementing					
Evaluation					

A format can be developed for classifying all of the current functions that have been ascribed to administrators, as well as functions that may arise in the future. One category of institutional functions will serve to illustrate this claim. Taking the Support Services category as a case, all functions found in previously discussed listings can be included.

Figure 4. Support Services Functions

Institutional Function / Admin. Functions	Support Services						
	Transportation	Community Relations	Budgeting	Purchasing	Public Relations	School Plant	etc.
Policy and Planning							
Coordination and Developing							
Supervising and Implementing							
Evaluation							

The category of Evaluation which is common to more recent accountability programs can be classified as to levels or types of evaluation, as previously done by Saunders and Blake. (15)

Figure 5. Evaluation Levels

Institutional Function Admin. Functions	Measurement	Evaluation	Valuation
Evaluation			
Measurement			
Evaluation			
Valuation			

Ostensibly, the category problem of administrative functions, in parallel to the categories of evaluation is solved. This solution is effective at a structural level, where content can be added and given coordinate meaning. The *value* level functions which are needed to produce the criteria necessary to *evaluate* substantive functions are missing, i.e., to validate Harlow's initial contention that the major function of administrators is to see to it that ". . .the purposes of the enterprise are explicitly defined. . ." (1) is a higher level function.

This function then must be seen as separate from those included in the model developed for showing the interrelationship of administrative functions by type (Figure 3). Decker has proposed a design for developing institutional goals and objectives. (16) The design can be adapted to the effort to show the interrelationships of administrative functions by type.

Figure 6. A Model for Institutional Goals and Functions

Goals for Students:

Inst. Function Inst. Goals	Instruction	Staff Development	Student Services	Support Services	Evaluation
Overarching					
Development					
Specific					
Evaluation					

It may be seen in Figure 6 that the "purpose of the enterprise" spoken of by Harlow results from the goals that the educational institution sets for students. In each of the areas of institutional functions goals may be set by levels, overarching, developmental, and specific, which are derived from the goals for students.

The "purpose of the enterprise," as Harlow characterizes the need for administrative categories, can be placed in new perspective. The indefinite accumulation of non-repetitive categories of administrative functions on lists prepared by authorities on the subject can only lead to ambiguity in training programs for administrators.

The added confusion over the role of accountability as an administrative responsibility and as an evaluation of the function itself only compounds the difficulty of identifying the effective administrative function.

The model proposed above can be used as a vehicle through which to design, coordinate and implement an administrative training program which is comprehensive in scope and content, structure and coordination.

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CHAPTER 2.

THE SELF UNDERCUT BY POWER

STEPHEN ALLEY

Introduction

This paper is the second in a series devoted to an exploration of the various aspects of the self-in-its-situation. The series is entitled A Base for Decision.

In the first paper "The Self and the Other," the author was concerned with the authenticity of relationships between the self and others. Lying, in which the liar takes advantage of the "opacity" of the relationship, and manipulation of others were examined, together with their effects upon the liar and manipulator. The current paper pursues further the theme of manipulation.

"The Self and the Other" was read at the December 1979 meeting of the Far West Philosophy of Education Society in Los Angeles, and appears in its Proceedings of that meeting. The third and fourth papers in the series will be presented at the Institut fur Padagogik, der Universitat Wurzburg, in June of 1981.

As in the first paper, the author acknowledges his debt to William [illegible] O'Neill.

There is another part of the conceit that the Other exists for me. It manifests itself in the quest for power. Of all mankind's problems, none has proven so absolutely obstinate as the appropriate use of power. We are no nearer its solution now than we were in the days of Thrasymachus, who was only describing the power politics of the Athenians as they dealt some thirty years before with the Melians when he told Socrates that "...in politics, the genuine ruler regards his subjects exactly like sheep, and things of nothing, night and day, but the good he can get out of them for himself."

Whatever he can get out of them by ruthlessness, cruelty, and cleverness is his, and it is his by right of the stronger. It is the doctrine of "Might makes right."

For the moment let us look at another manifestation of power and its misuse. In ordinary relationships between people, and more frequently than not, there is often one who seeks to dominate the other. The domination is achieved through any one of a number of devices--and the astounding ingenuity of the human animal is nowhere more clearly exhibited than in its devious search for more and ever more effective ways to extend its domination over another, or others.

Eric Hoffer spoke once of the way in which a girl, sometimes charmingly, seeks to make a puppet of her young man. The implicit granting or withholding of favors is her instrument, and she tries it in many ways to get him to bend to her will.

Less attractive is the image of the female Ghost described by C. S. Lewis in *The Great Divorce*. The Ghost had been, in life, an ambitious woman who had succeeded in driving her husband through two jobs and a denial of his own interests to affluence; and as she had detached his interests one by one from him, so she had detached his friends, until only *her* interests and *her* friends are left. Yet she has a grievance: he had died before she really was finished with him--she cannot forgive him for that, though she professes to be willing to do so. And there is the knowledge that he finally came to hate her. She had done her duty to the very end, and if he *did* come to have a nervous breakdown at last, she claims her conscience is clear.

She offers, in what she conceives to be generosity, to take charge of him again, if the angels meeting her on the plain before Heaven will give her a free hand. "Don't consult *him*: just give him to me, do you hear? ... I was only beginning. There's lots, lots, lots of things I still want to do with him ... I must have some one to -- to do things to."

Her husband is conceived as her property, *her* object, in the same sense her house was hers. "What right have you to keep him from me? I hate you. How can I pay him out if you won't let me have him?" And as she speaks she towers up and suddenly snaps into nothing, leaving only a sour, dry smell in the air.

Just how bestial the desire to *possess* another really is, is shown in another example from C. S. Lewis in *The Screwtape Letters*. The senior devil, at the failure of the younger one, expresses himself in endearing words: "I think they will give you to me now; or a bit of you. Love you? Why yes. As dainty a morsel as ever I grew fat on."

The manner in which one ego may batten on another is here likened to an actual demoniacal feeding by one spirit on another -- altogether too close a likeness for comfortable dismissal.

Again, the misuse of power is only possible through regarding the other as Object in both cases of the Ghost and the senior devil. The Ghost's husband was her possession, a puppet through which she could recapture the power of her childhood days when she could pose her dolls at will, or scold or punish, or withhold approval as she pleased. The junior devil is regarded as good, by "your increasingly ravenously hungry uncle." Both are object in the Other, without distinction.

There is a tell-tale objectivity in the metaphors of education. Pupils are regarded as Things in such similes as "the little brown jug" theory of education, where a student is seen as a container into which information is poured, and the teacher is the pourer; they are conceived as answer-boxes, from which answers are received by promptings much as one receives one's weight and fortune by dropping a penny in a scale. The only task for the teacher is to drop the penny. Or the pupil is a calculator to be programmed properly to solve the present problem. The lament of one educationist, that the pupil could learn much more readily, "if only one knew which button to push," is revealing of the tendency to look at the pupil as Object.

To describe pupils as only biological phenomena or organisms is not less inhuman. Any conception of the pupil which denies recognition as a human being in his unique situation must miss the point of education, which is after all, the process of someone teaching someone else.

In that remarkable book Education Under Duress which has pursued a path so far from the conventional, the authors, O'Neill and Demos, have shown the de-humanizing effects of power. In the modification of behavior through changing belief, it is first necessary to strip the subject (read "victim") of his identity. Through a kind of psychological rape he is reduced to a state of ego-disintegration. The process begins in that "peculiarly Twentieth Century expedient of adjustment -- the stripping technique." The prisoner is undressed, bathed and disinfected. Then, say the authors, in quoting Beck and Godin:

> Arrival in prison was followed by a physical inspection of incredible minuteness. All papers and metal objects, including belt buckles and the like, and even bootlaces, were confiscated, and metal and horn buttons were removed from clothing. Every seam was examined for hidden articles as was every orifice of the body. These physical inspections together with cell searches were repeated with the same thoroughness on an average of about once a fortnight.

Thus, the prisoner is forced to view himself as literally stripped to his merely biological essence as an organism. He has no identity supports. He is naked psychologically as well as physically. Further steps in the process involve being provided with "identity stigmata", after being catalogued as an object; being tattooed, having his head shaved, receiving a number instead of a name, being assigned to a cell instead of a vocation, receiving drab, uniform clothing without regard to size or condition, etc.

17.

Degrading tasks and punishments are imposed, leading the worker to perceive his work as "value-less." Punishment for the most trivial circumstance, work at the most meaningless tasks -- all is done to humiliate and degrade, to force the prisoner to respond to his situation as an animal. He has no recourse but to revise his self-concept because he must experience himself as behaving as an animal does. He is de-humanized. One must not think this over-dramatic. De-humanization is both terrible and ordinary.

We have commented earlier on the reciprocal connection between acting-upon and being acted-upon. Just as the teacher or parent cannot inspire self-growth without growing herself, and just as one cannot diminish another's being without being diminished oneself, so one cannot de-humanize without being de-humanized. Lord Acton said, "Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." The absolute corruption here is the complete de-humanization of the persecutor.

We have of course described here Broudy's spiritual murder, although the example given by Beck and Godin is a more complete and particularly acute form. In the corruption and inhuman behavior of the tormentors, we witness a similarly acute variety of spiritual suicide.

The matter must become one of importance to educators. At one time the avowed purpose of education was to make "gentle men", to increase sensitivity, compassion and sensibility. Gentling mankind seems to have gone the way of other hopeless goals, yet it must be revived. Hoffer reminds us that when Mahatma Ghandi was asked what worried him most, he replied, "The hardness of heart of the educated." And Hoffer also reminds us that among the twenty members of the Nazi group in charge of the extermination of the Jews, there were a university professor, eight lawyers, a dental surgeon, an architect, an art expert, and an ex-pastor. Thirteen out of the twenty were highly educated in their professions. There was, also, a high percentage of school-teachers who became Nazi Gauleiters. Ghandi's worry seems well-grounded.

Education does not in itself furnish a guarantee of concern for others. In education the curriculum must provide for experiences which will develop compassion, which will humanize. It has long been known that the people of the lower classes often have a strong fellow-feeling for each other, a fellow-feeling born of adversity and similar, shared, difficult experiences. Student-teachers who work with the handicapped, particularly handicapped children, often show a pronouncedly increased compassion for others, a compassion which carried over.

Again, it is necessary to note the importance for education of the recognition of the unique individual in his unique situation. Teachers must see pupils as they are. Parents must see their children as they are: each one a person in a very human predicament, each unique possessed of all the dignity--often pathetic, sometimes tragic--that the importance of being one-of-a-kind confers on him.

CHAPTER 3.

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN EDUCATION: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES

CHARLES TOTO, JR.

Prologue

Issues in education are "contemporary" because they do not sum up events which are complete. They are contemporary because they are alive; because they are vital and absorbing.

I would expect that a discussion of such issues would tend to identify a variety of principles and/or organization of concepts for those of us who are interested in a growing understanding of particular aspects of the process we call education--either in this country or elsewhere, either here in some period of time and place or similarly elsewhere on the planet earth.

The theme of my presentation is mainly philosophical. Therefore, let me share with you a number of generalizations:

First, philosophy interacts with all of the elements within a culture, i.e., elements of the political, social, economic and educational scene. It influences and is influenced by those elements. Philosophy is also an interdependent and a reciprocally interaffecting aspect which makes up the totality of a particular culture in a particular time in the history of that culture.

Philosophy cannot be viewed in and of itself as determining social change in any manner--literal, linear or simplistic. Dewey has stated that ideas that are at one time a means of producing social change assume another appearance when they are used as a means to prevent further change.

Second, we can also say that, in the sense of the conventional, philosophy is ideological. In that sense, it serves partly as a rationalization for cultural assumptions about human nature, the world we live in and the manner by which we govern our behavior. It is a rationale for changing such assumptions.

The relationship between ideology and contemporary educational issues is difficult to characterize. A definition of ideology does not necessarily point the way to clarity and direction. Generally, the relationship can be seen in the social direction in which ideology seeks to direct social action. Ideology, in this sense, can be a value-impregnated system of thought.

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An examination of contemporary educational issues would appear, to me, to call for an analysis of critical assumptions pertinent to the interrelationship of aims and goals, the role of the school, the purpose of instruction and the outcomes of learning and life.

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I would expect that discussion focusing on the interaction of theory and practice within the classroom would provide insight into contemporary issues pervading the overall and combined implications of the school and its setting.

I would also expect further insight to be gained into the interrelationship of philosophical, historical, socioeconomic and psychological dimensions of contemporary issues in education.

In these apocalyptic times of social change, it well may be that fundamental inconsistencies of tradition cloud the image of the relation of schooling and education to our other social institutions and to the larger society in general.

The main thrust of my attention, then, is that rather than supplying simplistic responses to age-old concerns of modern-day controversies, one might find it a more profitable venture to erect a basis of information and observation more conducive to an appropriate questioning of the goals of education and the tasks of schooling.

The process of developing appropriate goals and objectives, for the most part, in a consistent framework of reference dealing with critical assumptions behind said educational goals and objectives has been haphazard, contradictory, fragmentary and too often ill-conceived.

The lack of a systematic and critical examination of our beliefs and subsequent clarification of values has also led to confusion, disillusionment and diffusion of energies in the translation of goals and objectives onto an operational level of the what, the where, the when and the how in education - hence the climate of contemporary issues.

Aims and goals in education are grounded in critical assumptions we make about the nature of human species; the world in which that species must live; and the forms of conduct and the modes of thought by which that species - individually and collectively - governs its behavior.

The most self-conscious group in American society is perhaps the educator. Perhaps even more so is the educator of educators. Providing a rationale for the discussion of contemporary issues in education is not easy. It is difficult for me to think of another area of human concern in which reasonable discourse so easily evades the constraint of disciplined thought and rigorous examination of critical assumptions. We seem to be depressed emotionally and regressed intellectually.

My message which deals with perspectives - or dimensions, if you wish - in contemporary issues is further beset by a counterpoint of views which insist upon the urgency of schooling or the abandonment of schooling, all this accompanied by genuine controversy which often descends to the lowest level of bitter argument.

For a long time now, theorists in education have indicated the necessity of some degree of attention to what they designate as significant areas of concern, namely the choice, definition, and organization of desirable goals and objectives for the schools. Discussion which focuses on the learner, the learning environment and the problems of instruction, curriculum, organization and administration have certainly not been overlooked.

I am certain you are already enumerating issues in education which you believe to be crucial. However, we need not exhaust our energies in the salvage and maintenance of the educational enterprise. It is certainly within our capabilities to organize the schools so that pleasure in learning is facilitated. It is certainly within our capabilities to provide for the pleasure of esthetic expression. And it is certainly within our capabilities to aid in the development of the good person - whether it be in rural areas, urban slums or affluent suburbs.

With this in mind, then, may I suggest again the appropriateness of a consistent and systematic framework of reference within which one may continually ask the questions: what is real, what is true, and what is valuable? Most important - what does this have to do with the purposes of schooling, who goes to school and why, and how does it enable me, the teacher, administrator, counselor, parent or student to understand my culture and my existence? How does all of this justify the task of the teacher? The task - for all of us - is that of cultivating reasonable skills into the translation of contemporary issues into the questions which I have just posed.

True we teachers are not consciously prone to be philosophical-minded. It is also true that it is in the stated aims and goals of education that we can look to the underlying presuppositions or assumptions about the nature of people, the worlds in which they live and the values by which they live or ought to live. The crux of issues is that we do not ask often enough: why we do this or why we do that. The crux of issues is often mindlessness.

True, we as teachers do enter our classroom with certain beliefs and convictions which shape our approach to teaching and learning. When we as teachers or participating members of the learning society exert ourselves to define our beliefs, we find that we are engaged in asking the questions asked and examined by philosophies of education.

To reject this approach to education implies that without that approach one operates blindly, if not in confusion. True, one may say that philosophical perspectives can be systematized and reduced to doctrine and dogma. Yet one can safeguard oneself against this by a persistent asking of the basic questions. In fact, I hope we can all agree that it is the fundamental task of the schools and that process called education to continually ask these same questions.

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Perhaps discussion of another sort dealing with suggestions of the magical and the mythical at a time when the prime trend of our culture appears to indicate a movement toward the supreme joys of simplification would prove to be worthwhile for some. A discussion such as this must absolutely consider that this trend, approved by a certain portion of the educational establishment, denies the rationality of intellectual endeavors.

The major contemporary crisis today in education is totally cultural. It is a crisis that implicates the basic value-fabric of our society. It is a crisis in which the progress of modern technology is not the road to Utopia unless it is accompanied by a concern of what makes a good human being. It is a crisis in which the thrust of contemporary issues and controversy strongly suggest a pressing need for change. Indications are that all of society, if not most, view the schools as not achieving noble expectations or even achieving minimal standards.

We are experiencing an upheaval in basic assumptions underlying the course and destiny of western civilization these last 500 years. This crisis involves the total citizenry as well as those of us in the educational establishment.

What can be done about issues in education? I make no claim to being a prophet in my own time. All I can do is encourage us to pursue the building of a foundation and framework which provides a beacon in the direction of choice among a number of alternatives.

A long time ago Aristotle said:

> "As things are...mankind are by no means agreed about the things to be taught, whether we look to virtue or the best life. Neither is it clear whether education is more concerned with intellectual or moral virtue. The existing practice is perplexing; no one knowing on what principle we should proceed--should the useful in life, or should virtue, or should the higher knowledge be the aim of our training; all three opinions have been entertained. Again, about the means there is no agreement; for different persons, starting with different ideas about the nature of virtue, naturally disagree about the practice of it."

John Stuart Mill echoed that:

> "A general state education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another; and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body."

Ashley Montague further states:

> "Education is already in process of being revalued by those who have largely been the victims of it; namely, the young, and this revaluation must be encouraged in the light of what education should be for--the making not merely of instructed or knowledgeable human beings, but of good human beings. One of the principle lessons that we must learn from our past experience is that knowledge is not enough. Education should be training in the art and science of being a warm, loving human being, and all other training should be secondary."

To be human is to be in danger. Ashley Montague said it well. He also qualified this by adding that "by virtue of a unique nervous system, a nervous system which is much more plastic and educable than any other living animal, man is capable of confusing and endangering himself considerably."

The significance of this statement for educational systems and educational reform is profound and imperative. It is true that certain philosophical systems have provided models of desirable behavior and learning. The burning question is: can they be successful in the solution of personal and group problems?

If an ultimate aim of education is the humanization of each and every person, we must take heed. Perhaps it is high time to discard the old notion that education is different from life--therefore, separate from life. Perhaps it is high time that in answering the question of what is good education, we ask the questions...what is a good life, what is a good person?

Two great trends appear to characterize our times. One is that of the mechanization of humans, the other that of the humanization of machines. The peril is that in our preoccupation with stability and orderly process, we have unwittingly aided in furthering the mechanization of human beings.

In times past, it was believed that the schools presented an article of faith in its practices of standards and norms. It promised a climb up the ladder of success by strict adherence to the acquistion of large bodies of knowledge and accompanying social skills. Today, even more so, the promises of education seem to require ever-increasing amounts of the same. Too often, it is mere ritual accompanied by intellectual dishonesty.

The structure of the school remains essentially the same. It stamps indelibly upon youth the inevitable conclusion that learning is a saleable commodity. The educational experience is not intended to have any immediate meaning for those involved. The rewards, irrevocably, are projected into the "someday of the future." Its ephemeral promise? Economic reward destined for later in life.

Today, more so than ever, we place our faith and our aspirations for the future lives of our youngsters and our concomitant concern for the survival of our society upon the ultimate ends of the long climb up the lengthening educational ladder. Pushing youth up that educational ladder results in favoring the individual who begins the climb early in life. Furthermore, instruction too often spoon-fed and thrust upon the student serves only to blunt the desire for independent learning.

Schools not only expend energy providing answers to questions yet unasked by students, they for the most part demonstrate a lack of concern for the satisfaction of human needs in the most significant areas of what it means to be human.

Schools have failed to focus on the emotional and spiritual needs of their client - the student. Professional literature has suffocated us lately with its relentless battering at our insensitivities to the basic need of each student *to know himself* as well as his universe.

Again, I repeat: If an ultimate aim of education can be said to be the humanization of individuals singly and collectively - it would seem to follow that we must focus our attention on the critical assumptions underlying the translation of human teaching for human learning onto an operational level. What makes a "good" society, what makes a "good" person, what makes "good" education *are* the real contemporary issues in education. We have been sidetracked into *not* confronting them.

* * * *

Earlier, in my presentation, I alluded briefly to polarities in our society, polarities which are felt within the educational establishment as well. This polarization, based not necessarily on political lines, but cultural ones, is not essentially a difference between the education of whites and other minority groups; neither is it a difference between the education of the relatively affluent and the poorer segments of our society; it is a polarization between the old culture and the new. The former gives preference to group rights rather than personal rights. It favors competition above cooperation, efficiency over participation; it sanctions means over ends, social forms above personal expression.

* * * *

If the task of making sense out of contemporary issues is dangerous, then let us come to grips with the perspectives afforded us by philosophical foundations in education. If the task of the future is dangerous, then let us come to grips with it on its own unique terms. If we are prone to treat crucial issues as symptoms, then let us seek to understand the underlying malaise and remedy it. If the task of the future is dangerous, then let us now begin the constant and rigorous assessment and reassessment of aims and goals in education so that operationally they may release the human potential for all levels of education, for all partners in education.

Although I prefer to think of myself as a realist when it comes to American education, I recognize and confess to a high degree of optimism. The gathering of such a group here today bears witness to that optimism. I am, and have been, critical of American education and rightfully so--I believe it can and shall be a vehicle to the good life.

To achieve this good life means a partnership arrangement for student and teacher, the public and the general society. It shall mean paying attention to the importance of the area we call non-intellectual--that is emotions, feelings, interests, values and character. It shall also mean critical selection among educational problems in which the "solution" emphasizes the integration of affective and cognitive elements in individual and group learnings.

It shall also mean the synthesis and distribution of what we know into a process-oriented model or models consistent with the nature of learners, the realities within which they, singly and together, must cope and the wherewithal to choose wisely among a variety of alternatives pertinent to the development of self and others.

It is not a question of a model which draws from one discipline or another in the social foundations, but again the question of a process-oriented model which contains many "truths" and which seeks vigorously to reduce its "inconsistencies."

Yes, the supreme aim of education is the recognition of human goodness, goodness in a far wider range than our present-day use of the word suggests. It is you, the teacher, who is the facilitator in the creation of wisdom and reason, the right convictions and the passionate longing for them. It has been said that the greatest ignorance lies in one who does not love, but hates what reason shows to be right and just.

Education is more a process than a preparation for life. School is not only a place for the giving of authoritative bodies of information, but a place for the development of one's creative powers. It is obvious that an aim which starts with the person may forget that aim. Equally important is the recognition that both must be held in constant view.

For those of us in education, the basic step would appear to be in the direction of what human beings can be. On human terms, we so seldom discuss or are encouraged to do so--think of what the good life is. Not only is human progress somewhat dependent upon an increase in knowledge, but upon a discovery of higher values in the humanistic lexicon of the good life.

I share the belief that teaching is primarily an art. We cannot afford to let this art disappear into mediocrity just because change appears to threaten our ability to teach. Teaching, characteristically, is, and has been a moral enterprise; its primary intent, basically, is to benefit others.

The teacher and client both are intelligent human beings capable of using themselves and their knowledge in an infinite variety of ways. Both are unique and becoming more so each day. Both are capable of utilizing the resources available to them in order to solve the problems for which each has a responsibility.

* * * *

As I reach the final stages of my message--which has dealt with contemporary issues in education generally and philosophical perspectives specifically, I am inclined to share my concerns:

In a society that seems to be spinning apart, individual identity becomes significant and essential to survival. A new kind of clustering is taking place in America. It is a banning together of concerned individuals, anxious and threatened by an isolation from the familiar and the reassuring.

The disintegration of traditional values has been hastened by a lack of rational alternatives and philosophical direction; furthermore, these values are made seemingly irrelevant by the impact of dynamic social forces.

We are confronted with a seemingly insoluble paradox of mass education and the dilemma of freedom and equality. The values of mass education are inherently at odds with those of an elevated liberal culture.

Are the concepts of freedom and equality contradictory? Are they interrelated? Or are they variables within the context of the target concept of humanization?

The question of what we as teachers can do to avoid the increasing dehumanization of the individual is linked to the structure of mass society and its search for new definitions of freedom and equality.

When defined, questions about contemporary issues in education lead to the question of criteria as bases for truth. Obviously, the acceptable criterion influences one's answers to prior questions. You individually and in concert with your colleagues shall have to answer or at least search for answers to the eternal questions: what is true, what is real, what is of value?

Do we have the resources to translate our aims and goals operationally? I know we do! On the intuitive level, the arts and humanities provide a veritable storehouse of humanity's dreams and aspirations, conflicts and tragedy, sense of purpose and awareness of life's direction.

The social foundations and other modern disciplines - as well as philosophy - contain the academic and scholarly insights which give structure to our concept of particular aspects of reality.

Experientially, the learning environment need not be an artifical reality. It can be, must be, and shall be wherever and whenever the student realistically engages in contact with a real world of learning. It can be, must be and shall be where growth as a "good human being" is inevitable and not just a weak promise of maybe, maybe not.

27.

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CHAPTER 4

REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTENT-CONSTRUCT VALIDITY DISTINCTION IN EDUCATIONAL TEST THEORY, ABSTRACT

FREDERICK S. ELLETT, JR.

The distinction between content validity and construct validity is one of the most commonly accepted doctrines in educational test theory. Perhaps one of the most influential accounts of the distinction between content and construct validity has been one given by L.J. Cronbach in his 1971 article "Test Validation."

This essay presents the central aspects of Cronbach's account of the content-construct validity distinction. This essay argues that Cronbach's account relies in its formulation on the doctrine of traditional behaviorism and the general doctrines of logical empiricism.

It is argued that the doctrine of traditional behaviorism is untenable and that the doctrines of logical empiricism concerning the nature of scientific theories are also untenable. Given these considerations, it is argued that no basis has been given for drawing the distinction.

I

It cannot be doubted that educational test theory has exerted a tremendous influence over educational program planning and evaluation as well as over educational research. One of the most commonly accepted doctrines in educational test theory is the distinction between content validity and construct validity. Indeed, in Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests, a committee of the American Psychological Association, which was charged with setting forth quality standards for commercially published tests, has drawn the distinction in this way:

> Content validity is evaluated by showing how well the content of the test samples the class of situations or subject matter about which conclusions are to be drawn.
>
> Construct validity is evaluated by investigating what psychological qualities a test measures; i.e., by determining the degree to which certain explanatory concepts or constructs account for performance on the test.[1]

And perhaps one of the most influential accounts of the distinction between content and construct validity has been the account given by L.J. Cronbach in his 1971 article, "Test Validation."[2]

This essay presents the central aspects of Cronbach's account of the content-construct validity distinction. This essay argues that Cronbach's account relies in its formulation on the doctrine of traditional behaviorism and the general doctrines of logical empiricism.

It is argued that the doctrine of traditional behaviorism is untenable and that the doctrines of logical empiricism concerning the nature of scientific theories are also untenable. Given these considerations, it is argued that no basis has been given for drawing the distinction.

II

Let me begin my summary of Cronbach's views by noting that he applies the terms 'test' and 'test scores' to all procedures for collecting data including observations, questionnaires, ratings of artistic products, etc. Protocols and qualitative summaries are included as well as numerical scores.[3] I can now state in general form Cronbach's positions.

First, when a *test* is being validated, the test is only one element in a *procedure*. A validation study examines the procedure as a whole. For every aspect of the setting in which the test is given and every detail of the procedure may have an influence on performance and hence on what is measured. A report of the validation research contains, explicitly or implicitly, an *operational definition* of the procedures under study. This definition indicates the class of *stimuli* to which the person is exposed, the *instructions* he is given, and the rules by which his *responses* - what the person does in "response to" the stimuli and instructions - are evaluated.[4]

The set of conditions that obtain in the validation, that is, the actual events which take place in the inquiry, is only one among many sets of conditions that fit the definition. As Cronbach has written, for the research to be maximally useful, all such sets of conditions should be equivalent; that is, they should have the same relationships with other variables, and, consequently the *same significance*. The person planning a validation study must make a judgment as to which aspects of the procedure can be altered without substantially altering a person's score and which cannot. Aspects considered likely to affect the score should be controlled and should be included in the operational definition. The many combinations of conditions that conform to this definition constitute a *universe of admissable operations*. The average of the scores the person would receive if he were (hypothetically) observed under all admissible sets of conditions is referred to as his *universe score*.[5]

At one place Cronbach stated that the universe definition amounts to a *working hypothesis* that all operations admissable under it are equivalent, i.e., that all aspects which affect its meaning have been specified.[6] Yet he went on to say that if an investigator were to omit a significant aspect from the definition of his procedure, then another investigator whose procedure differs in this aspect is measuring a different variable. According to Cronbach, the findings of the former investigation do not apply to the latter.[7]

Thus, the universe specification (or definition) defines a class of procedures. Yet as Cronbach notes, in most instances the test developer exhibits or describes one procedure and points to a broader universe that, in his opinion, it represents. An achievement test is said to represent a body of content outlined in the test manual. That outline constitutes the universe definition. To ask: Are the tasks used in collecting data truly representative of the specified universe? is to examine *content validity*.[8]

Cronbach went on to say that where a description *implies* what is to be expected of a person, the validator asks: Is this expectation sound? Validation of *implications* of the description is *construct validation*. Furthermore, a description that refers to the person's internal processes (anxiety, insight) invariably requires construct validation.[9] Here it is important to note that Cronbach has treated internal processes (i.e., mental organizations, mental processes or psychological states) as constructs or theoretical terms. We'll return to the significance of this fact later on.

As we have seen, the content validity has to do with the test as a set of stimuli and as a set of observing operations. The measuring procedure is specified in terms of a class of stimuli, an injunction to the student that defines what he is to do, and a set of rules for observing the performance and reducing it to a score.[10] Here it is important to notice that judgments about content validity should be restricted to the operational, externally observable side of testing. Judgments about the subject's internal processes state hypotheses and these require empirical construct validation.[11]

A *proper response specification* deals with the result a person is asked to produce, not the processes by which he fails or succeeds.[12]

Cronbach criticized the classification of objectives attempted in Bloom's *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives* because it did not adhere to the standard that Cronbach proposed. For the taxonomy deals with the intended "behavior" of the students - the ways in which individuals are to act, think, or feel.[13]

Cronbach has proposed that statements on response specification follow traditional *psychological behaviorism*. He quoted with approval the position advanced by Kendler that equated "behavior" with "publicly observable acts and movements ranging from responses that are defined in terms of their achievements to muscular constructions and glandular secretions."[14] Cronbach and Kendler clearly were willing to make inferences about mental processes but they insisted on a sharp distinction between observations (or descriptions) and inferences.

III

Given this brief summary of Cronbach's positions, it should be clear that, whatever else is involved in content validation, there is the requirement that the responses - what a person does in "response to" the stimuli and instructions - be specified in behavioristic terms. Chronbach has expressed clearly a commitment to traditional psychological behaviorism.

In support of this commitment Cronbach cited works by Kendler, Hively, et.al., and Miller.[15] But the citations neither present a unified view of "behaviorism" nor do they provide good reasons for adopting the view. The passage by Kendler, which I quoted above, used "behavior" to cover such things as physical movements, muscular contradictions, and glandular secretions. Kendler's position seems most akin to the physicalism of the Vienna Circle. Such thinkers held that every psychological concept (i.e., expression) has a definition which directly or indirectly derives that concept from physical concepts. For example, R. Carnap and C. Hempel, both of whom subsequently abandoned physicalism, held that a statement I make about another person, e.g., that he is excited or angry, can mean nothing else than that he is behaving in such and such a way, that he will respond in such and such a way to certain stimuli, that his central nervous system is in such and such a state, and so on.[16] Hively, et. al. cited Skinner as the representative thinker on behaviorism.[17] But Skinner has continually rejected physicalism. For Skinner, it is a fact that we know on a great many occasions when someone is angry, tired, excited or perplexed. This common knowledge we have of the mental states of others certainly is not a knowledge of physiological processes, about which we are largely ignorant. For Skinner, if behaviorism is to clarify the "testable content" of psychological concepts, it should not concentrate on the inner physiology but rather on what lies open to observation, namely, physical circumstances and outward behavior.[18] Cronbach and Hively, et. al. also cited R.B. Miller's work in support of the behavioristic program. But aside from the fact that Miller used terminology similar to behaviorism, i.e., 'stimulus' and 'response,' he stated quite clearly that his descriptions were not "scientific", but "heuristic" and that we must hope that fundamental research - by the behaviorist - can someday produce the scientific, descriptive system.[19] Cronbach himself acknowledged that task description is usually couched in imprecise, everyday terms.[20] It seems clear that Scheffler's criticism of Skinner, which Hively, et. al. had noted, is totally appropriate against Miller. Although Miller's work contains the seemingly technical terms 'stimulus' and 'response', the terms aren't used in their rigorous sense but as mere substitutes for common, everyday terminology.[21]

Hively et. al. have stated that, in principle, there appears to be no reason why this (behavioristic) approach cannot be extended to the operational definition of any goals of instruction. But they fail to mention any of the central difficulties which face a behavioristic reduction of psychological terms. Malcolm has argued that behaviorists have wrongly assumed that first-person psychological sentences - such as, "I am angry" or "I am in pain" - have the same "content," or the same verification as the corresponding third person sentences. By observing you I can verify that you have a headache; normally I do not verify that I have a headache by observation of my behavior. First-person reports and utterances are not based on observations.[22] Furthermore, Putnam has argued that there are easily imaginable worlds in which people feel pain but manifest it in the most extraordinary ways. Possessing the concept of pain simply is not the same things as knowing what connections in fact obtain between pain and pain behavior.[23] At any rate, contra Hively et. al., behaviorism has been subjected to more than one damaging critique and refutation.

It is important to note that many have argued that the explanation of human actions requires knowledge of the agent's thoughts and beliefs, desires, and capacities. One cannot know that one of these is part of the explanation of a certain action without knowing the other two.[24] Indeed, human actions - what persons do - are individuated by such things as the person's beliefs, intentions or volitions.[25]

According to Cronbach, then, content validation requires that the person's response - what he is doing - be specified in behavioristic terms. Content validation when formulated in this way is committed to traditional psychological behaviorism. Construct validity, on the other hand, must be used when mental terms - internal or psychological states and processes - are involved. Yet if behaviorism is untenable, and hence there is no way to specify the responses in behavioristic terms, then the distinction between content validity and construct validity collapses. The only way left to specify a person's responses - what is he performing or doing - requires the use of psychological terms and concepts.

IV

One might grant that my previous remarks about the untenability of behaviorism undermines the claim that content validity be built upon responses specified in behavioristic terms. But one might argue that there is another way to draw the distinction. One can rely on the logical empiricist distinction between observational terms and theoretical terms. Then, one can hold that the response specification be given in observational terms. Hence, content validity will be built upon observational terms. On the other hand, psychological terms will be treated as theoretical terms or constructs, and construct validity will be concerned with statements involving psychological terms.

According to logical empiricists, the distinction between observational and theoretical terms represents the way scientists carry on their activities. A scientific theory, as many of these thinkers have held, consists of constructs and observable interconnected by statements.[26] Cronbach's remarks about what is observable (or describable) and what is inference fit well with the logical positivist viewpoint.[27]

For the logical empiricist, the distinction between observational statements and theoretical statements (statements about theoretical entities or constructs) rests on the explication of the distinction between observational terms and theoretical terms or constructs. Here are some examples: observational terms - 'red', 'touches', 'stick'; theoretical terms - 'electron', 'dream', 'belief', 'gene.'

The basic difficulty with the logical empiricist's position is that no such distinction is drawn or employed by scientists themselves. The logical empiricist has not accurately explicated or articulated the practice of science. Many writers have come to criticize the position held by the logical empiricists. As Putnam has argued:

> (a) If an "observation term" is one that cannot apply to an observable, then there are no observation terms.
>
> (b) Many terms that refer primarily to what Carnap would class as "unobservables" are not theoretical terms; and at least some theoretical terms refer primarily to observables.
>
> (c) Observational reports can and frequently do contain theoretical terms.
>
> (d) A scientific theory, properly so-called, may refer only to observables. (Darwin's theory of Evolution as originally put forward is an example.)[28]

Achinstein has noted that the thesis that a list of "observational" terms can be compiled is defended by those envisaging the possibility of constructing an "empiricist language." An underlying assumption of this program is that there exists a unique (or at least a most suitable) way to describe what is or can be observed. But there are numerous ways to describe what one observes in a given situation, some more infused with concepts employed in various theories than others. As Achinstein has argued, this does not preclude classifying certain reports as observational. But he concluded that there is no special class of terms that must be used in describing what is observed. In a later chapter he considered the doctrine that there exists a fundamental distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical terms as employed by scientists. Achinstein concluded that none of the positions will generate the very broad sort of distinction so widely assumed in the philosophy of science.[29]

Given these arguments, Cronbach cannot find that "empiricist language" which divides terms into observational and theoretical terms. For there is no special class of terms that must be used in describing what is observed, a class of terms which stands in contrast to a class of theoretical terms. Content validity cannot require that a person's response be specified in that "observational" language. Although a person's response need not always be specified using psychological terms, it seems that the specification will often use psychological terms.[30] Given that the "distinction" between observational and theoretical terms does not exist, the content-construct distinction which was based upon it collapses.

V

Up to this point, I have tried to show that the distinction between content validity and construct validity as it has been formulated by Cronbach relies on the doctrine of behaviorism or on the logical empiricist's doctrine of the distinction between observational and theoretical terms. Given that these doctrines are untenable, Cronbach's distinction between content and construct validity collapses.

Here I want to make a few remarks about one of Cronbach's central claims that psychological terms are theoretical constructs or theoretical terms.[31] Cronbach's discussion of how theoretical terms acquire empirical meaning, however, needs further critical scrutiny. Clearly Cronbach rejected the view that all terms must have operational definitions.[32] Yet he seemed to hold both that each construct must be connected with an empirical indicator and that a construct gets some of its meaning from the rest of the (theoretical) network.[33] If I understood him correctly, he seemed to hold both a Carnapian reduction-sentence (or partial definition) view and a Feiglian implicit definition (or systematic import) view. At any rate, although I can't pursue it here, I believe there are serious problems with both of these views.[34]

Let us consider the claim that such terms as 'pain', 'anger', 'believe', etc. are theoretical terms in the positivistic sense.[35] That is, psychological terms or concepts are implicitly defined merely by a theory, by a body of beliefs which has testable consequences involving behavior. Putnam has argued that it is false that terms occurring in a theory have no meaning apart from the theory; this is false not just in the case of psychology, but in general. Furthermore, such terms as 'pain,' 'anger', have a *reporting use*, and thus would not be implicitly defined *merely* by theory.[36] The conceptual framework of psychology, a framework which includes mental or psychological concepts, is not a theory in the positivist sense. As Skinner has said, we know on a great many occasions in ordinary life when someone is angry, tired, excited, or perplexed. We have this common knowledge of the mental states of others. There are weighty reasons for thinking that the vocabulary of ordinary life and of literature has a genuine point.[37]

Although I can't argue it here, it seems to me that the rejection of the claim that psychological terms are theoretical terms could lead up to a greater change in measurement theory than the rejection of the distinction between content and construct validity. Perhaps this leads the way to the doctrines of *verstehen*.

VI

The distinction between content validity and construct validity is one of the most commonly accepted doctrines in educational test theory. Perhaps one of the most influential accounts of the distinction between content and construct validity has been the one given by L.J. Cronbach in his 1971 article "Test Validation."

This essay presented the central aspects of Cronbach's account of the content-construct validation distinction. It was argued that Cronbach's account relies in its formulation on the doctrine of traditional behaviorism and the general doctrines of logical empiricism.

It was argued that the doctrine of traditional behaviorism is untenable and that the doctrines of logical empiricism concerning the nature of scientific theories are also untenable. (It was also argued that it is a mistake to hold that psychological terms are theoretical terms in the positivistic sense.) Given these considerations, it was argued that no basis has been given for drawing the content-construct validity distinction.[38]

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29. P. Achinstein, Concepts of Science, Baltimore, 1969, ch. 5, Observational Terms and ch. 6, Theoretical Terms. It seems that Hempel has come to agree. See "On the Standard Conception of Scientific Theories," in M. Radner and S. Winokur (Eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. IV, Minneapolis, 1970, 142-163.

30. For a related discussion of these issues see H.G. Petrie, "Theories Are Tested by Observing the Facts, or Are They?" Philosophical Redirections of Educational Research, N.S.S.E. Yearbook 1972, Part I, Chicago, 1972, 47-73.

31. Cronbach, pp. 444, 451-4, 462-464, 475-484.

32. Ibid., p. 480.

33. Ibid., p. 476-482.

34. H.I. Brown, Perception, Theory and Commitment, Chicago, 1977; See also Putnam, 1969.

35. Cronbach, pp. 475-6, 481.

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37. Max Black, "Some Aversive Responses to a Would-be Reinforcer," in Caveats and Critiques, Ithaca, 1975.

39.

38. It should be noted that Cronbach appears to have reached this conclusion, too. But his arguments and conclusions are really quite different from the ones developed above. See L.J. Cronbach, "Validity on Parole: How Can We Go Straight?" New Directions For Testing and Measurement, 5, 1980, 99-108.

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CHAPTER 5

YVES SIMON ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT

GERALD E. McDONALD

There is a view shared by writers on moral development that the training of youth is not only not working as well as presumedly it once did, but that the older generation has never been very successful in enforcing its beliefs, convictions and ways of behaving upon the young. Lawrence Kohlberg rejects a centuries-old approach to moral development in which a set of virtues is first defined and then imposed upon children by exhorting them to exercise each virtue until the habit of the virtue is formed. Taking issue with Aristotle, Kohlberg insists that character is not formed by instilling "good" habits in the young. As he says, "We do not become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts."[1] If character were formed this way, we should be able, for example. to predict that virtuous behavior will occur in a variety of particular situations, but according to Kohlberg, the findings in the Hartshorne-May study of children show that in most instances, people are neither consistently honest (defined in the study as resistant to cheating) nor dishonest and that if a person cheats in one situation, we cannot predict that he will or will not cheat in another. In this context, Kohlberg's main point seems to be that the process of instilling rules of conduct in the young doesn't work because it is indoctrinative. Because what is learned is imposed from the outside, a child's conduct may change when a situation prompts him to do otherwise. Instead of this imposition, a child should be encouraged to elicit sound moral judgments through a way of thinking about moral issues that is appropriate to his level of cognitive development. Growth in eliciting moral judgments may not be a sufficient condition for mature moral action, but as Kohlberg says, "moral judgment, while only one factor in moral behavior, is the single most important or influential factor yet discovered in moral behavior."[2]

Carl Rogers believes that the human organism has a wisdom of its own that enables the infant as well as the mature adult to choose what is good for it. Of course in the mature adult, the valuing process is more complex, highly differentiated and conscious and "there is no guarantee that the choice that is made will in fact prove to be self-actualizing," but as the individual takes advantage of what is given to him in experience, as he is able to clarify and accept his feelings, as he is able to get in touch with his whole organism, errors are correctable.[3] The focus of evaluation resides within the organism and moral development is seen as a healthy, self-enhancing process, as growth from within, as vital and organic and not merely as cerebral.

Unfortunately, this is not the picture of most of us. Very soon, according to Rogers, teachers, parents and others in society impose upon the individual a fixed system of "do's and don'ts" that is remote from his experience and rarely examined. Still the individual attempts to internalize this fixed moral system so that he becomes dependent upon the dictates of others and loses confidence in his own ability to make moral choices. The process is a vicious trade-off in which the individual accepts blindly the values that are intruded from the outside so that he may be loved and made to feel secure. "Do what I say, Johnny, or mommy won't love you." Join the army and knuckle under to its regiment and the army brass will praise you as a real man, a good soldier, and maybe even a hero. Meet my course requirements and I will call you a good student. Conform to the civil laws and society will call you a good citizen. In short, meet the expectations of others, accept their values unthinkingly, and the individual will be honored, loved, respected, and made to feel secure. Of course, for Rogers, this manner of behaving is phoney and unhealthy, since it runs counter to a natural tendency within the individual to make his own choices. Man by nature tends to be free but society has made him unsure of himself and dependent on the intruded values of others.

Among the values-clarifiers, a number have voiced similar concerns. According to Sydney Simon, Charles Merrill, Howard Kirschenbaum, and others, traditional methods of persuading children to adopt a predetermined set of "right" values may have worked in the past because society itself was more stable and the pace of life was slower; but today, technology has quickened the pace of society and introduced far reaching changes--the family is an endangered species, church influence has declined, and the messages of the mass media are conflicting indeed. In its confusion, youth can no longer look to others for the "right" values; in fact, there are no values that are valid for everyone. Since values change in a changing society, youth must develop a way of validating its own values and it is here that the school can help by assisting the student to think critically about important options in his life and encouraging the making of choices with a considered view to their consequences, a process according to the values carifiers that is based upon the valuation theory of John Dewey.[4]

By contrast, B.F. Skinner claims that the appeal to an inner man to explain behavior is misdirected and that although the species man continues to exist autonomous man must be abolished. If child-rearing practices have failed to shape behavior, it is because the contingencies of reinforcement of which the child-rearing practices are a function, have changed. If children act dishonestly at times, it is not that they have failed to discover for themselves the meaning and worth of telling the truth; rather, it is because adults have failed to control the external conditions that prompt these children to lie. In short, if adults want to shape the behavior of children, they must know clearly how they want their children to behave and then systematically arrange those conditions in the environment that will prompt the desired behaviors. As Skinner says, "The direction of the controlling relation is reversed: a person does not act upon the world, the world acts upon him."[5]

Clearly, these writers hold opposite opinions on the manner in which man develops morally. On the one side, moral values must be elicited from within while the attempt to impose them from the outside will not work and may be harmful; on the other side, moral values must be imposed from the outside and autonomous man is no longer needed to explain his behavior. Yves R. Simon holds a middle position between these two. As a scholar, his interests have centered in investigating the nature and functions of authority and in discovering principles to which we can refer in an attempt to proportion exactly authority and liberty in any given situation; nevertheless, much can be gleaned from his writings that provides a viable explanation of how moral values are acquired. As a Thomist, he subscribes to the view of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas that habit formation forms the basis for character development. Good character is the result of good habits or virtues which in turn are brought about by practicing the acts of the virtue. In the formation process, man is not merely passive to receiving virtues from some outside agent; neither by going through the motions of practicing them does he bring out into the open what he already possessed in a hidden state. Rather, he has the capacity to bring to completion (the virtues) certain natural inclinations which exist in him as the beginnings of the virtues.[6] In other words, before he forms the habit of telling the truth, he already has a tendency to be truthful and, furthermore, he can act on this tendency. Indeed, children do act upon this tendency sometimes beyond what adults consider the parameters of good taste. This natural power to bring to completion a tendency in human nature may be compared to healing. A sick person is restored to health by the natural power within him and, to extend the analogy, a doctor helps only by providing the patient with the means by which he can be restored to health.

However, the analogy breaks down somewhat when we consider the moral development of the child. There is no deficiency in nature when a sick person unaided is restored to health, but Yves Simon argues that the child is unable to rule itself.

> To be ruled by another may be expedient or even necessary on the ground of one's inability to rule one's self. This is the case with children and this is also the case with the insane, the feeble-minded or the criminal, who are legally considered, as well as children, to be minors. A minor is a person supposedly unable to govern himself,

> that is, to provide for the right order to be assured by his actions, even within the field of his personal aims. A minor is supposed to be incapable of knowing what is good for him--that is why another person has to guide him in the very pursuit of his proper good. The inability of the minor to govern himself, to pursue his proper aims by himself, is always based on some deficiency.[7]

This natural deficiency does not signify that the child is unable to act upon its natural inclinations to virtue or that it is a clay-like creature to be shaped from the outside. Neither is the parent, therefore, a sculptor who shapes his offspring according to his design of the morally good person. To the contrary it means that although a child is inclined to be truthful and may at times act upon his inclinations, he may not because his reason is not yet sufficiently developed to grasp the reasonableness of the rule of conduct. Because he is not yet able to direct his behavior unaided, a parent or guardian must substitute his judgments for those of the child. In effect, he is being told to accept or believe that the rule of conduct prescribed is good for him.

However, the authority of the parent, namely, his right to speak and be obeyed, must be based upon the temporary character of this deficiency and as a consequence, he must respect the virtuous tendencies within the child, exhorting it to practice the virtues, appealing to its reason whenever possible, even compelling behavior at times, and in general providing the means that will gradually enable it to form its own character. Because the child only gradually becomes an autonomous adult, parental training must be viewed as a cooperative art vis-a-vis the developing nature of the child. However, parental training that consistently ignores the appeal to the child's reason and freedom is coercion and to try to form character by coercion alone is to destroy it in the making. Moral conduct is the act of free agent and we simply cannot make men good by an act of Congress. Nevertheless, although persuasion is the proper instrument of paternal training, coercion at times and at the outset of a child's formation may be necessary. As Simon says, "The point is, precisely, that good habits possibly determined by coercion are to be numbered among those conditions under which morality can develop."[8] As a consequence of being compelled to practice good habits, he becomes accustomed to acting in this manner so that eventually he may become virtuous, being able to do freely what he did by restraint or fear of punishment.

Granted that the deficiency in question lessens or tends to disappear as the child gradually becomes the adult, parental authority remains, although it must be proportioned to the child's moral development, a function of authority that is clear enough in principle but may be by no means clear in its application. Treating a sixteen-year-old like a six-year-old is obviously an abuse of authority, but what decisions should govern the conduct of a sixteen-year-old? Mary is going to the high school prom, but at what hour should she return home? The proper exercise of authority depends upon a number of contingent circumstances and calls for a prudential judgment on the part of Mary's parents. Prudence is the act of making a practical judgment honestly and with careful deliberation, yet without full knowledge of the factual course of events that follow. At the same time, it is understood as a command to be taken as a rule of conduct by the free will of another. Simon observes that in the practical judgment, some consideration about the reality of things is involved, namely, some theoretical consideration.[9]

Let us assume that Mary's parents decide in favor of having their daughter stay out until 1:00 A.M. on the night of the prom and that who Mary's friends are, the nature of the transportation, the distance from home and other theoretical considerations have been carefully weighed. Because their decision has not been made in haste; because, in fact, it was made after a fully conscientious and honest deliberation, they know that their decision is a sound one no matter what the factual consequences may be. However, an automobile accident occurs and Mary is taken to the hospital. In fact, the evening has not been good for the family, but it cannot be said that the decision was unreasonable or unsound because of the accident. Granted that the soundness of the theoretical considerations proved to be faulty, nevertheless, Mary's parents could not possibly foresee what was going to take place. Their decision was a sound one, therefore, not because of their theoretical considerations but because it was made with the best of intentions. They have nothing of which to accuse themselves.

Professor Simon notes that the substitutional intentions of authority are sometimes taken to mean that parental direction aims at the private good of the parent and that the welfare of the child consists essentially in conforming to the dictates of authority. Referring to a distinction made by St. Thomas Aquinas between the domain of freedom and the domain of servitude, Simon observes that "when a man is governed for his own good or for the good of society of which he is a member, this man is said to be free. On the contrary, one who is governed for the private welfare of a master is said to be slave."[10] Both forms of government are dependent on a person in authority, but whereas the domain over the slave is intended for the private welfare of the master and the continued servitude of the slave, dominion over the child is intended ultimately to assist him in becoming an autonomous individual and a responsible member of society. The tendency to equate dependence with servitude, however, is not uncommon.

The salient elements of Yves Simon's position on moral development may be summed up in a few sentences. Authority is "an active power, residing in a person and exercised through a practical judgment to be taken as a rule of conduct by the free will of another person."[11] From the outset, the child must trust the person in authority and accept on his word that what he is being told to do is reasonable and in his best interests. Gradually, however, he must be encouraged to understand the reasonableness of this rule of conduct imposed upon him and to act upon it freely. Character grows from within and the function of authority is not to create it but to provide for it the most suitable conditions of growth. This interior development would not be possible, of course, if the human person were not endowed with the natural tendencies of reason and free will to reach a definite end, namely, intellectual and moral autonomy.

Perhaps the chief difficulty with this position is that its proponents have failed to respond to the immediate and pressing questions being raised about the rearing of youth in a modern technological society. The modern attempts to explain how values are acquired simply do not include a notion of a cooperative relationship between a guardian and a child in which both are formative causes. Currently being challenged is the view that the child is not yet ready to make sound moral judgments and that as a consequence, the parent or other guardian must substitute his or her judgments for those of the child. In a real sense, society has prompted this critical attitude. In the United States, parents no longer share a common body of religious beliefs, convictions or moral judgments and, increasingly, they appear to youth to be confused, arbitrary, contradictory and even hypocritical. At the same time, there is a growing awareness that these same young people are confused and that they must learn to think for themselves.

As a philosopher, Simon is intensely interested in determining the essential functions of authority insofar as they are based upon the metaphysics of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. The notions of deficiency and gradualness are based upon the Aristotelian doctrine of act and potency and upon the postulate that nature is self-constituted within experience and in its essential character, necessary. At the same time, however, nature exists within the realities of experience and contingency so that its manner of existing is unnecessary, a precarious world where events are not foreseen and where the upbringing of man is dependent upon prudential decisions of those in authority. As he says:

> This philosophy...sets at the beginning of all becoming the determinations of being, the essences, which doubtless do not exist in a necessary manner, but which are necessarily what they are and which in virtue of their identity with themselves necessarily tend to exercise certain activities and to reach certain ends. But within every natural essence there exists a principle of indeterminateness, matter. Contingency is thus introduced into the world of determinate essences.[12]

Current writers on moral development are trying to cope with the alienation of youth by advocating specific strategies or methodologies, e.g., behavior modification, conflict resolution, nondirective guidance, the activity of resolving moral dilemmas proper to the stage of the individual's cognitive development, active listening, the exercises of values clarification and other forms of facilitating discovery. The attempt is to deal in the most effective way possible with events the way they are, not with how they ought to be in light of a priority and empirically untestable considerations. By contrast, Professor Simon is saying that current solutions are simply dealing with symptoms while ignoring the underlying disease, namely, a society that is moving away from a natural order upon which the essential functions of its institutions are derived.

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CHAPTER 6

PICTORIAL DEPICTION AND VISUAL CORRESPONDENCE

JON W. SHARER

Abstract

The nature of how pictured images in art represent ideas or things has been a long standing issue. One of the questions that has been raised is whether the relationship between the pictorial configuration and what it represents is necessarily arbitrary or whether the relationship between what is pictured and what is represented is contingent on a visual correspondence. Nelson Goodman contends that such a visual correspondence is unnecessary. Accordingly, almost anything can stand for anything else. To determine whether representation is an arbitrary manner the term "representation" must be clarified. An analysis of the term indicates that there is a distinction between the use of "representation" to mean standing for or symbolizing and the use of "representation" to mean depicting. Indeed, the former use of the term involves an arbitrary relationship between what is pictured and represented; however, the latter use of the term necessarily implies a visual corresondence between the pictured image and what it depicts.

Inquiry into the nature of pictorial representation has precipitated much controversy. One of the issues in this controversy is whether representation is in any way contingent on a visual correspondence between what is pictured and what is represented. The discussion has focused in part on whether something which resembles something else can be said to represent it. At first glance, it may seem unlikely that either resemblance or a visual correspondence is necessary for representation since one can look at the same pictorial configuration and have it represent different things or one can look at different pictorial configurations and have them represent the same thing. In both cases if something looks different from the looks or lack of looks of what is represented, it seems doubtful that representation is contingent on a visual correspondence between what is pictured and what is represented. Nelson Goodman indicated that such a visual correspondence is unnecessary since "...almost anything can stand for anything else."[1] Therefore, for a picture to represent an object it must be a symbol for it or stand for it. For example, a pictured dove may stand for peace or a kind of bird and a pictured lamb for Christ or a kind of animal.

This example, however, reflects only one sense in which the term "representation" can be used. "Representation" can also be used to mean that a pictured object depicts an instance of that object. Nevertheless, Goodman does not adequately distinguish between the use of "representation" to mean standing for or symbolizing and the use of "representation" to mean depicting.[2] For example, in the following passage, he uses "depiction" and "representation" interchangeably:

> To say that depiction is by pictures while description is by passages is not only to beg a good part of the question but also to overlook the fact that denotation by a picture does not always constitute depiction; for example, if pictures in a commandered museum are used by a briefing officer to stand for enemy emplacements, the pictures do not thereby represent these emplacements.[3,4]

"Representation" can be used to denote something or depict it, but N. Goodman is not clear when "representation" is being used for the latter in contrast to the former. For Goodman, "Denotation is the core of representation."[5] However, there is a difference between using "denotation" as a synonym for "representation" and using "depiction" as a synonym for "representation." For example, we might say that a lamb denotes or stands for Christ, but we would not say that it depicts Christ. Similarly, we might say that a painting depicts Margaret Mead, but ordinarily it would be odd to say that the painting denotes Ms. Mead. To depict something is not to denote it, for each asks a different question. This difference can be observed in asking, "What does a picture of the American flag depict?" in contrast to asking, "What does a picture of the American flag denote?" What is depicted is a flag, but what is denoted is what the flag stands for, i.e., the United States. Likewise, what a picture of Ms. Mead depicts is not what a picture of Ms. Mead denotes. What is depicted is the person, but what is denoted is what the person stands for, e.g., a renown anthropologist. Nevertheless, Goodman seems to overlook this difference in his use of "representation." A painting that represents a particular individual can be said to depict that individual, but for Goodman it also denotes that individual as the following quote indicates. "A picture that represents (i.e., depicts) Churchill, like a predicate that applies to him, denotes him."[6] Yet, denotation implies an arbitrary or standing for relationship to what is denoted, as in the case of the lamb and flag, and no degree of resemblance is necessary for reference as Goodman has suggested.[7] In contrast, an image which depicts does not have a visually arbitrary relationship to what is depicted.

While Goodman acknowledges that an image which depicts cannot be used to stand arbitrarily for something, i.e., pictures which stand for or denote enemy gum emplacements do not depict these emplacements, he does use "denotation" as a synonym for "depiction." In short, he implies that everything which denotes does not depict while everything which depicts does denote. Yet, if there is a sense in which denotation can be used synonymously for depiction, he has not demonstrated what it is. There, however, are clear uses of denotation which imply standing for something in an arbitrary manner, as in the flag example. Thus, it might be said that his view of pictorial representation is implicitly based on denotation--

a view which is underscored by the inclusiveness of his contention that resemblance is not necessary for reference.[8]

The subsequent analysis indicates that a visual correspondence is necessarily implied in our use of "depiction." In this analysis, two uses of "depiction" will be considered: 1) depiction to indicate a portrayal, as in the Margaret Mead example, and 2) depiction to indicate nonactual or imaginary objects or events, as in the case of a pictured unicorn. These uses of "depiction" will be referred to respectively as depiction$_1$ and depiction$_2$.

Max Black in his article, "How Do Pictures Represent," distinguishes two senses of the term "depict." One sense refers to the actual event in which case it is said to portray that event, and the other sense refers to an imagined event in which case it is said to display that event. In the quotation below, Black's choice for an actual event is Washington's crossing the Delaware and for an imagined event, Hitler's crossing of the Hudson.

> Let us call Washington's crossing the Delaware the original scene to which the painting refers; and for the sake of precision, let us say that the painting does not merely depict that scene but rather portrays it. Then the painting of Hitler's imaginary river crossing will have no original scene to portray; but it may be said to display a certain subject. Thus portraying and displaying will count as special cases of depicting.[9,10]

In order to appropriately use the term "depict" in both of these senses, one must be clear about whether something is an actual event or an imagined event. To illustrate, the term "depiction"$_{1,2}$ will be applied to Jacques Louis David's picture "Oath of Horatii." According to the Oxford Classical Dictionary the Horatii are fictional characters rooted in popular tradition. Since the Horatii are fictional characters, the event depicted in David's work depicts$_2$ rather than portrays the Horatii. Before accepting so apparent a distinction, however, one should examine the premise upon which it is based, i.e., the difference between the actual event and the imagined event.

With the "Oath of Horatii" there is ambiguity concerning what the three figures represent. Using Panofsky's distinctions of pre-iconography, iconography, and iconology, the figures respectively represent: three men standing with their arms raised (the level of facts and description), the three Horatii (the level of analyzing stories, images and allegories), and "...the virility of new republican ideals in opposition to the degeneracy of the old regime" (the level of interpreting cultural and historial influences upon themes and concepts expressed).[11,12] Given that the three figures can represent several things, which of these can they be said to depict$_1$? It has already been stated that the Horatii are fictional figures and, hence, cannot be portrayed. But, what if instead of being considered Horatii, the figures are considered to be three men. Men do actually exist and thus pictures of them might be portrayals. However, if the picture is not of particular men who were living, can the picture be considered a depiction$_1$?

In order to clarify this, one needs to consider how one describes what is pictured. When one describes something pictured as a "horse," one is detecting electromagnetic energy which fits one's concept of horse. E.H. Gombrich and Max Black have stated that pictures do not contain concepts, e.g., of horse or men, as containers carry objects.[13,14] Instead, they depict$_{1,2}$ instances of that for which one has a concept. Hence, though the horse and men depicted$_1$ are not of a particular horse or particular men, they are an instance of a class of things which actually exist and, therefore, can be portrayed.

If the pictured instance is to be considered a depiction$_1$ of an actual instance, one must in principle be able to observe the actual instance. Since men and horses can be observed, pictures of them are portrayals. However, when the thing pictured stands for something intangible, it is not a portrayal of that intangible something, for it does not make sense to talk about a picture depicting$_1$ something for which there are not observable instances. Hence, the three figures in David's painting cannot be said to portray, i.e., depict, new republican ideals.

Moreover, when one paints a picture of a mammal, e.g., a horse (or one of the Horatii), one is not depicting$_1$ it being mammal. One does not depict$_1$ a horse being a mammal any more than one sees that it is a mammal. Though something must be seen for it to be a portrayal, what is seen must be of the same logical category, and horse and mammal are of different logical categories. Just as one does not observe sensations, one does not observe mammals but instances of them.[15] What is portrayed is not the mammal, vertebrate, quadruped, or herbivore, but the horse that is an instance of each of these.

A picture that depicts$_1$ something must manifest visual relationships between the instance of a thing pictured and the actual instance of it. There are objections, however, to the view that there needs to be a visual correspondence between the pictured and actual thing for a picture to be a portrayal. Nelson Goodman has stated a logical objection to the resemblance view of representation, i.e., A represents B if and only if A appreciably resembles B. Resemblance is reflexive since things that look alike look like each other. If representation is merely a matter of looking alike, then it follows that whatever is pictorially represented also represents the pictorial configuration. However, this is far from the case. A picture of a horse may represent a horse, but a horse does not represent a picture of a horse.

"An object resembles itself to the maximum degree but rarely represents itself; resemblance, unlike representation, is reflexive."[16]

> The plain fact is that a picture, to represent an object, must be a symbol for it, stand for it, refer to it; and that no degree of resemblance is sufficient to establish the requisite re-

> lationship of reference. Nor is resemblance necessary for reference....[17,18]

If one applies the above objection to a picture which depicts$_1$ something, the same problem can be observed. A pictorial configuration may depict$_1$, i.e., portray, a horse, but the horse (which resembles other horses more closely than a picture) does not depict$_1$ the pictorial configuration. What is symbolically represented or depicted$_1$ by a pictorial configuration rarely if ever symbolizes or depicts$_1$ the corresponding pictorial configuration. From this difference between the pictorial configuration and what is referred to, however, it does not follow that a visual correspondence is unnecessary for depiction$_1$. Let the pictorial configuration P depict$_1$ an object O, such as a horse. If O cannot depict$_1$ P, it does not follow that P cannot depict$_1$ O. Similarly, if a visual correspondence is not a condition for O depicting$_1$ P, it does not follow that a visual correspondence is unnecessary for P to depict$_1$ O.[19]

The aforementioned comments by Goodman, imply a difference in function between the pictured configuration and what is represented or depicted$_1$ through this configuration. Horses are not used in the same way as pictures. One horse does not depict$_1$ another anymore than one picture usually depicts$_1$ another.[20] But, pictures are commonly used to represent or depict$_1$ other things. From a pictured horse not having the same function as a live horse, one can say that a visual correspondence is not a sufficient condition for depiction$_1$. However, while a visual correspondence is not a sufficient condition for something being depicted$_1$, there is an argument for it being considered a necessary condition for depiction$_1$.

In positing that a pictured depiction$_1$ of something must have visual features in common with that thing, it does not follow that the thing portrayed portrays the picture; but that for something to be a portrayal of something else, both things must have sufficient perceptible features in common to be called an instance. Even if the instance of a concept pictured does not look much like an actual instance of that concept, a picture can be a depiction$_1$. For example, the woodcut by Albrecht Durer of a rhinoceros (1515) does not closely resemble an actual rhinoceros.

> When Durer published his famous woodcut of a rhinoceros, he had to rely on secondhand evidence which he filled in from his own imagination, colored no doubt by what he had learned of the most famous of exotic beasts, the dragon with its armored body. Yet it has been shown that this half invented creature served as a model for all renderings of the rhinoceros, even in natural history books, up until the eighteenth century.[21]

Though Durer's rhinoceros is distorted by his imagination and limited information, it is still a pictured instance of something of which there are actual instances in the world. Hence, it is a depiction$_1$. Even when pictorial configurations vary considerably, as in the differences among a painting, photograph, and drawing which portray a horse, this correspondence must exist.

With increasing variability among instances, however more knowledge or perceptual information is necessary to perceive this correspondence. Indeed, someone who is knowledgeable about the perceptual characteristics of horses may need very few features of a pictorial configuration to recognize it as a picture of a camouflaged horse. But, fewer or conflicting pictorial features generally produce increasing ambiguity as in the picture by Villard De Honnecourt of a lion and porcupine (1235). The lion has teeth like a human, a chest like a bull, and a mane like a lion. Since the features are ambiguous, the pictured creature may or may not be considered an instance of a concept. If somebody detects sufficient features between the pictured schema for lions and other instances of lions, De Honnecourt's picture might be considered a borderline case of a depiction$_1$. There is a point, though, at which the knowledgeable percipient will not be able to find sufficient perceptible features to warrant a pictorial configuration being considered an instance of a concept. In such cases, if the pictorial configuration is used to refer to a beast or something else, it represents or stands for this other thing. A pictorial configuration of this kind either arbitrarily symbolizes something through established conventions, as in the case of the dove, or a concept is arbitrarily attributed to it, as in the case of the inkblot. Since the relationship is arbitrary, anything might stand for one's concept of something, as Goodman has suggested.

There is a distinction, however, between arbitrarily designated pictorial configurations and depictions$_1$. With depictions$_1$ or portrayals the pictorial configuration is an instance of the concept portrayed, but pictorial configurations which are arbitrarily related to a concept are not instances of that concept and consequently cannot be considered portrayals. A pictured square does not depict$_1$ a horse. If a square is a symbol for a horse, it is not an instance of a horse which is being pictured but a symbol which stands for instances of the concept of horse. As has been indicated, N. Goodman assumes that a pictorial configuration can stand for just about anything. In a way he is correct, for pictures can be used to stand for anything. The problem is his disavowal of the need for a visual correspondence in representation. Without such a correspondence, a picture denotes or symbolizes but it does not depict, for a visual configuration cannot arbitrarily denote instances of a concept and still depict$_1$ or portray an instance of that concept.

Depictions$_2$ of imaginary objects, i.e., displays, are like depictions$_1$ in that an imaginary instance of something pictured must also be commensurate with perceptible features of other instances of that thing. For example, with a picture of a unicorn there needs to be sufficient visual correspondence between the pictured animal, other pictures of unicorns, and features of our concept of unicorn to warrant that the pictured animal be considered an instance of the concept of unicorn. What pictorial configurations count as an instance of a unicorn has been developed through inculcations. This does not mean, however, that almost anything can stand for a unicorn and still be a depiction$_2$ of one. Any possible pictorial configuration cannot be considered a depiction$_2$ of a unicorn since it does not correspond to established paradigms of our concept of unicorn. A pictured triangle is not a depiction$_2$ or a unicorn anymore than square depicts$_1$

a horse since in both cases the image which depicts$_{1,2}$ is not an instance of the concept of unicorn or horse.

As the discussion indicates, depiction$_{1,2}$ is one usage of "representation" in which a visual correspondence between the pictured and depicted$_{1,2}$ object is a necessary condition. This cannot be an arbitrary relationship. One cannot reasonably say that the ash-can depicts$_1$ the palm tree in one's backyard or that a swastika depicts$_2$ Hitler crossing the Hudson since ash-cans and swastikas can only have an arbitrary relationship to such things. Pictorial configurations which have an arbitrary relationship to their referents can denote or stand for, but they cannot depict$_{1,2}$. This distinction concerning representation is outlined below:



Thus, since Goodman disavows the necessity of resemblance for representation, denotation is the bedrock of representation for him. This is underscored by his use of "denotation" for both depiction and representation. Nevertheless, almost anything cannot stand for anything else and still depict it, as we have seen.

Documentations.

1. Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art*, Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., New York, 1968, p. 5.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

4. The italics are the author's.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 5,40.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 5,40.

9. Max Black, *Art Perception and Reality*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1972, p. 96.

10. While Black uses the notion of original scene as a criterion for portrayal, he implies that such a scene is the actual event. In reference to Hitler's crossing the Hudson, he states that "...here there is no actual event to serve as a control of the painting's fidelity" (*Art Perception and Reality*, p. 96). Within the body of this paper *actual* will be used rather than *original* as a criterion for portrayal since it is parallel to displays being non-actual objects or events, i.e., imaginary or fictional objects and events.

11. Erwin Panofsky, *Meaning and the Visual Arts*, Doubleday and Company, Inc., Garden City, 1955, pp. 26-54.

12. John Canaday, *Mainstreams of Modern Art*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1959, p. 12.

13. E.H. Gombrich, *Meditations on a Hobby Horse*, Phaidon Press, New York, 1963, p. 2.

14. Max Black, *Art Perception and Reality*, p. 110.

15. Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, Barnes and Noble, Inc., New York, 1949, pp. 213-214.

16. Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art*, p. 4.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

18. The italics are the author's.

19. Likewise, if a horse does not stand for mammal, it does not follow that there isn't a relationship between each, for one is a subset of the other.

20. It is possible for a picture to picture itself and for the pictured configuration, thereby, to depict the picture.

21. E.H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1969, p. 81.

CHAPTER 7

'DARE THE SCHOOL . . . ': G. S. COUNTS REVISITED

HUGH C. BLACK

This time 'round in its history of crises every decade our public school system is such an endangered species that we would do well to turn for much-needed guidance to relevant knowledge regarding educational purposes. Helpful, I suggest, is a visit or revisit to a classic from another crises decade relevant to the 1980s: the 1932 John Day Company publication of a fifty-six page pamphlet of three essays by George S. Counts under the title: *Dare the School Build a New Social Order?* In 1969 Arno Press and the *New York Times* republished it as a selection by Lawrence A. Cremin, advisory editor, in its series entitled: *American Education: Its Men, Institutions and Ideas*. Then the claim was made that it had retained its place in the literature because "it influenced thought and practice in its own time" and provided "the basis for subsequent scholarship."[1] My purpose here is to examine and get before us what Counts advocated in the 1932 crisis, to evaluate his challenges to the teaching profession in the light of subsequent events and literature, and to suggest what fruitful possibilities I can for our helping the public schools.

This is important, for the schools in the 1980s are in a crisis situation reminiscent of the great trial they underwent in the 1930s. Stanford historian David B. Tyack recently wrote of public education as a declining industry in which "Beset by public criticism and retrenchment, arguing over who is to walk the plank next, educators in many districts have very low morale."[2]

So Tyack described our "social situation" in his significant American Educational Studies Association "R. Freeman Butts Lecture" of October 25, 1979. He saw the educational enterprise in the 1980s, as in the 1930s, ceasing to expand and to enjoy its characteristic optimism. In fact, ours, he said, represents an era of "retrenchment" and a "great challenge for those who believe, as I do, that the common school *is* a public good, an institution essential to the continuous recreation of democracy and social justice."[3] "What we need. . . in American education," he argued, "is a tough-minded attempt to reformulate the purposes of public education in order to enlist the support this basic institution will need in the next generation."[4] Echoing the 1976 words of Butts himself, Tyack asked: "What role can public education play in creating a more just society?"

Butts's words had been: "The problem for education is how to develop a sense of community that will work to achieve and maintain a just society."[5] In our Bicentennial Year Butts had specified our educational need. We must work hard to the achievement of the modern-day trivium of "freedom, equality, and justice" after twentieth century debates over the quadrivium of "academic discipline, social efficiency, individual development, and vocational competence."[6] Controversies over the latter have lost us a spirit of community and diverted us from the wisdom of the Founding Fathers: the notion of the community upon which public education should be based being "the emerging political community."[7]

In 1932 Counts also faced a social situation of crisis in America and saw the need for giving education forward directions. Then, as some of us see in the 1980s, the schools were looked to for possibilities in overcoming what Counts described as the disencnantment with "the brutalities, the stupidities, the hypocrisies, and the gross inanities of contemporary life."[8] "We have a haunting feeling," he said in words true today, "that we were born for better things and that the nation itself is falling far short of its powers."[9]

My initial revisit to Counts's educational classic of 1932 causes me to wonder how radical it truly was. Some of us have remembered it as an extension of Progressive Education toward a movement which Theodore Brameld would make into "Reconstructionism." In a time of great social change it would be rather radical to hold that the school, alone of society's institutions, should take the initiative in bringing about a new social order turning around the evils besetting mankind.

But Counts grounded his suggestions on bed-rock realities of education in American society which would be stressed later by the wise and conservative-tending I. L. Kandel in the 1938 controversies. Counts's opening paragraph reported that happenings of his day "would seem to suggest that our schools, instead of directing the course of change, are themselves driven by the very forces that are transforming the rest of the social order."[10]

So Counts declared in the first of three addresses delivered in February 1932 embodied in the later John Day pamphlet under the more daring title by which Counts is remembered. In Baltimore he had addressed the Progressive Education Society under the more restricted title: "Dare Progressive Education Be Progressive." The second, delivered to a division of the Department of Superintendence in Washington, was entitled: "Education Through Indoctrination." And the third address, read to the National Council of Education the same month, was entitled: "Freedom, Culture, Social Planning, and Leadership."[11]

These three titles, I suggest, denote the main topics about which Counts had ideas he wishes to share with the educational leaders of his day. He was not so much, I think, daring the public school teachers to build a new social order. Rather was he criticizing the fallacious doctrines of Progressive Education and challenging the educational leaders in troublesome times to give better directions to what we do and should be doing in our public schools. He was an educational philosopher concerned about educational purposes in school and society following the track of John Dewey whom he quoted as having already diagnosed our troubles "in a recent paper":

> The schools, like the nation, are in need of a central purpose which will create new enthusiasm and devotion, and which will unify and guide all intellectual plans.[12]

Counts suggested that "if the schools are to be really effective, they must become centers for the building, and not merely for the contemplation, of our civilization." "This does not mean," Counts emphasized, "that we should endeavor to promote particular reforms through the educational system." His plea was for the school to have a "vision." "We should," he wrote, "give to our children a vision of the possibilities which lie ahead and endeavor to enlist their loyalties and enthusiasms in the realization of the vision."[13]

Counts was somewhat the radical in suggesting that such a vision should serve as a standard in terms of which "our social institutions and practices, all of them," should be "critically examined."[14] Only rarely, noted Counts, does the existing school wage war "on behalf of principle or ideal." In the grip of conservative forces, the school of his day Counts saw as "serving the cause of perpetuating ideas and institutions suited to an age that is gone."[15] In terms of the past, Counts saw the relationship between school and society as this:

> . . . on all genuinely crucial matters the school follows the wishes of the groups or classes that actually rule society; on minor matters the school is sometimes allowed a certain measure of freedom.[16]

But his times had changed, and "the future may be unlike the past." "We live in troublous times; we live in an age of profound chance; we live in an age of revolution," pronounced Counts in 1932.[17] Economic conditions especially were bad in those days of depression as we suffer today from inflation, recession, and our similar concern for jobs and employment.

As a part of his new vision for those depression days of 1932, Counts challenged the teaching profession--"at least its progressive (note the small "p") elements"--to pay attention even to economic problems. To its leadership Counts spoke strongly to the task of "reconstructing our economic institutions and of reformulating our social ideals so that they may be in harmony with the underlying facts of life."[18] Counts's vision was this:

> The man who would live unto himself alone must retire from the modern world. The day of individualism in the production and distribution of goods is gone. The fact cannot be overemphasized that choice is no longer between individualism and collectivism. It is rather between two forms of collectivism: the one essentially democratic, the other feudal in spirit; the one

> devoted to the interests of the people, the other to the interests of the privileged class.[19]

In the today of recession, as then in days of depression, economic conditions are bad. But can, or should, only teachers provide the correct "vision"--whatever it may be--for the economy? Those are very complex matters about which the professional economists and the politicians disagree mightily. And recent years show that teachers, when concerned about their own economic welfare--even if in pursuit of the human right for a living wage--, suffer terrifically from administrators, school boards, and from citizens. Does not much of our spirit of "retrenchment" today come from disenchantment of the mass of people with teachers and their seemingly ever-present entanglements over collective bargaining whether through professional organizations or union pressures rather than with purposes and philosophies of education? We have lost a precious common unity which should exist, I maintain, between teachers, administrators, and "the people." Are not teachers today too often seen as no better than Counts saw--as inadequate to their times--the so-called "practical" men of his day: "the politicians, the financiers, the industrialists"? Do not too many citizens view teachers today as exhibiting the kind of intelligence which Butts's mentor Meiklejohn condemned in 1942 in *Education Between Two Worlds* as representing the "cleverness and calculating self-interest of individuals, each of whom is, in the last resort, seeking his own advantage"?

Perhaps, I suggest, we can strive for a different kind of intelligence which Meiklejohn perceived as a proper ideal, which recognizes the strengths of Counts's argument in 1932 but which corrects it wisely, and which recognizes the true role of "the teaching profession" in its area of expertise. There are concerns, purposes, and visions which teachers are best qualified to promote in our schools which shall affect the general, social welfare--but in the political arena rather than that of economics. This is the central purpose of inculcating what Meilkejohn termed "the friendly wisdom of persons co-operating in a common cause" and which is a different kind of intelligence from the lower "self-seeking" intelligence so often displayed in our products of learning. Meiklejohn saw what we must achieve today through cooperative efforts of school *and* society: the ideal that we are "all members of a single family, tied together by the bonds of common purpose, of mutual understanding."[21] Teachers must become more professional experts at the kind of "learning" which affects the "becoming" of the "kind of persons" we need in a more truly democratic society seeking "freedom, equality, and justice" amidst our divisive controversies over what Butts has termed the quadrivium of "academic discipline, social efficiency, individual development, and vocational competence." Our troublesome times of the 1980s, as did Counts's in 1932, demand that citizens reach agreement--if not on economic remedies--on what the school should do to "shape attitudes, develop tastes, and even impose ideas."[22]

Dare we--teachers, administrators, and citizens all--take the initiative so much needed in the 1980s to apply the knowledge available from the past to get us better schools *and* a better society? What I am advocating within a context for recognizing the role of expertise is policy-making for our schools through total citizen participation under the John Adams insight that "The whole people must take upon themselves the education of the whole people." Practically, this means daring the schools to take the initiative in bringing together "all interested individuals, lay and professional, in developmental discussion, where they can learn to understand each other and influence each other's thinking."[23] After all, is not this the central purpose schools in our democracy should promote: the inculcation of the habit of democratic participation in decision-making?

The possibility of this imperative action I know from personal experiences in arranging five Town Meetings from April 1952 to April 1956 which demonstrated that citizen action worked in Houston, Texas. "The problems of public education concern all of us," had declared Roy E. Larsen, president of Time, Inc., in launching on May 16, 1949, a clearinghouse for citizen action called the National Citizens Commission for the Public Schools. His belief, in support of his experience of equality of opportunity through the public schools, was: "It is time for all of us to do something about them."[24] Under that influence which made available knowledge of how to do it, the Houston Forum, after a year of listening and getting facts, took action under the banner: "Local Schools Are What Local Citizens Make Them."[25] As a young educational philosopher at Rice Institute, I joined their leaders in arranging the Town Meetings which did make a difference--under the insight I proclaimed as their purpose:

> Our schools and the educational program of the public schools can be what we want only if our citizens acquire facts and accurate information about the schools and school problems, understand those facts and problems, become interested in the public schools, and intelligently exercise their citizenship responsibilities for public education.[26]

This argues for what we must be about now, and it suggests what special role of expertise the educational philosopher must play--which is in the service, I think, George S. Counts rendered us in his classic essays of 1932.

Time limitations prevent my full argument. But I urge you to read two sources in support of my thesis about citizen participation: 1) National Committee for Citizens in Education, Commission on Educational Governance, Public Testimony on Public Schools (Berkeley, Ca.: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), especially Chapter 8 by Reed and Mitchell on the history of citizen participation which significantly omits what I strongly recommend: 2) David B. Dreiman, How to Get Better Schools: A Tested Program (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1956).

You know, as do I, that knowledge about educational philosophies is essential and "foundational" to wise thinking about matters educational in school and society. The true "dare" for the 1980s, I suggest, is for educational philosophers to encourage citizen participation efforts to better our schools by bringing to bear knowledge of "better" educational philosophies than the extreme view espoused in the controversies which have divided us. Our role in the teaching profession is to extend Counts's insights criticizing Progressivism to that of Traditionalism and bring about better possibilities known to us which should prevent the catastrophes of the past we seem in danger of repeating.

Again we seem to be content today, as Counts pointed out in his day, "with action, provided it is sufficiently vigorous and noisy." He so described Progressive Education: "like a baby shaking a rattle." But since the middle 1970s, as earlier in the late 1950s, the noisy action has come from individuals seeking a "Return to the Basics" (1974) or "Return to the 3 R's" (1957-58). For example, as recently as the September/October issue of Science 80, an article on the "Crisis in the Science Classroom" charges this movement with damaging science and math teaching in elementary schools. Earlier critics of the movement decried dreadful losses in art, music, aesthetic and humanistic learnings. Once again the reaction, I fear, shall soon be the baby-rattling noise and cry for "Progressive Education." Educational philosophers must prevent this swing so typical of the past by initiating knowledge to citizen participation groups concerned about better schools. We must arrive at better purposes and directions for our public schools than either extreme of Progressivism or Traditionalism. There are educational philosophies offering "better" alternatives.

Counts's wisdom for us lies in counter-balancing the dangers of "Back to the Basics" or Traditionalism with knowledge also of the strengths and weaknesses of Progressive Education, his main message to us from 1932. I urge you to revisit his classic essay for detailed knowledge of his charges that Progressive Education fails to elaborate an adequate theory and is no more than a doctrine of anarchy or extreme individualism espoused by self-seeking individuals. The teaching profession today, as then, must represent and promote "the common and abiding interests of the people" by bringing to bear "the knowledge and wisdom of the ages." Thirty-one years of experiencing and espousing that alternative for educational philosophy as an ideal "tells" me that is the wisdom today from revisiting Geroge S. Counts's classic in education.

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3. Ibid., p. 50.
4. Ibid.
5. R. Freeman Butts, "The Search for Purpose in American Education," Today's Education, 65 (No. 2, March-April, 1976), p. 82.
6. Ibid., p. 77.
7. Ibid., pp. 82-83.
8. Counts, op. cit., p. 53.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 3.
11. Ibid., "Foreword," April 15, 1932, by Counts.
12. Ibid., p. 37.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 5.
16. Ibid., p. 28.
17. Ibid., p. 30.
18. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
19. Ibid., p. 49.
20. Alexander Meiklejohn, Education Between Two Worlds, 2d ed. (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1942), p. 205, as quoted in Hugh C. Black, Kenneth V. Lottich, and Donald S. Seckinger, THE GREAT EDUCATORS: Readings for Leaders in Education (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Company, 1972), p. 775.

21. Meiklejohn, op. cit., p. 207, as quoted in Black, op. cit., p. 775.

22. Counts, op. cit., p. 19.

23. "Dissent, Charlotte Ryan," in National Committee for Citizens in Education, Commission on Educational Governance, *Public Testimony on Public Schools* (Berkeley, Ca.: McCutchen Publishing Corporation, 1975), p. 233.

24. David B. Dreiman, *How to Get Better Schools: A Tested Program* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1956), p. 65.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

26. Black (not credited) in ibid., p. 48.

CHAPTER 8.

ACCOUNTING FOR ACCOUNTABILITY

JOSEPH S. ENGLE

Accountability Criteria: Levels of Evaluation

The effective administration of any organization is, at least in part, dependent upon the existence of accountability goals and systems, and the part these systems play in monitoring performance reviews. Accountability systems are logically connected to the goals and objectives from which they were either explicitly or implicitly derived.

Accountability systems can only be examined in respect to a more generic model which legislates the way in which discussion about the categories and variables associated with accountability systems can take place.

A generic model designed to frame discussions about accountability and to develop accountability systems will be of value, since it allows the accountability process to become deliberate. The model will also provide a stabilizing influence on emerging factors which can be integrated into the model's categories.

A major concern in the use of accountability criteria is the fragmented and often disjointed way in which some idea or action is held to be accountable. For instance, if there is an assessment, there must be a thing assessed and a rule by which it is assessed.

When the thing assessed and the rule used to assess it are set in tandem, it becomes immediately apparent that other rules also apply, directly or indirectly, to the same action. The question then must be raised as to how these rules can be kept "in line" with the thing assessed and the objectives from which the thing assessed emerges.

When the criteria from one set of objectives are used directly or inadvertently with another objective, confusion must arise. Moreover, when there are multiple objectives, and a plethora of activities, and thereby multiple criteria, some way must be formalized by which to maintain order and sequence, relevance and uniformity.

Accountability criteria, then, must be defined at different levels, and must be related to one another in a format which will allow clear articulation or those activities being related and the way in which they are being evaluated.

Three levels for defining accountability criteria can be used. At one level criteria are used to examine the "data" of the system. Data are the things produced by or resulting from the activities of the system.

At a second level criteria can be used to examine the "structure" of the accountability instruments used to collect the data of the first level. The structure of the instruments is the way in which the categories are arranged.

Third level criteria require an examination of the "perspective" used to develop the system will not only dictate the type of system developed but also will legislate the exact type of data to be collected. In other words, the perspective provides an informing hypothesis for all subsequent actions and evaluations.

The levels for defining accountability can themselves be discussed in three ways in terms of the levels of evaluation. Each level of accountability criteria can be examined by a specific type of evaluation.

Saunders and Blake (1976, pp. 124, 125, 126) have framed three levels of evaluation:

> Measurement
>
> ...involves a descriptive process whereby data are collected and collated, normal and assigned some form of statistical significance.
>
> Evaluation
>
> ...establishes the need to monitor the selection of categories to be used in any given evaluation as well as to monitor the procedures used to implement the evaluation.
>
> Valuation
>
> ...entails the need to specify an overarching design or model within which substantive knowing can be justified and integrated in some comprehensive manner.

By relating the levels of accountability criteria to the levels of evaluation, specific types of accountability measures can be identified. Table 3 presents a format for this relationship.

Specific accountability criteria can only be established, in a complex accountability system, by setting parallels which themselves must be identified and formalized in such a way as to be determinate of the relations set for the criteria of which the categories are directing agencies.

Table 3. Format for Interrelating Variables and Categories of a System: Accountability Criteria and Levels of Evaluation

Criteria	Measurement	Evaluation	Valuation
Perspective for Accountability Purpose	the value behind the accountability system is measured against acceptable	the over-arching value is examined for its structural integrity as a value system	examines the value of identifying a value-based from which to derive an accountability system
Structure of Accountability Instrument	instruments used to collect data are taken into consideration	categories and variables of the collection instruments as well as the procedures for collecting the data are examined	reason for the selection and/or construction of the specific instrument is scrutinzed
Data Collection	quantitative measurement of what is to result from the activity	evaluation includes discussion of context in which data gain meanings	recognition of the established value for collection for specified data

For instance, when a category and a variable (or a program and a category) are to be interrelated, formats with at least two axes will be necessary.

The scope of the format as found in the literature is usually determined by the task to be confronted; i.e., whether or not the components are to be categories and variables, or, by a subtle lateral level jump, programs and categories.

The exact items to be related in the format vary as the various items are adjacent in the hierarchy of the system. For example, at one level, variables may be related to categories and their relationship displayed in this format. At another level the categories can be related programs. Figure 4 illustrates this point.

How, then, and this is the point of the above discussion, does one develop a way to set generic patterns through which it is possible to assure the integrity of the diverse efforts to present rather complex issues in accountability?

Accountable Accountability: Criteria for the Evaluation of Accountability Models

Any proposal of how accountability is to be accomplished entails a review and understanding of the concept of models. When a design is set which performs the same function for all relatable factors, a basic model emerges. When, and this is the most comprehensive issue, the model which accomplishes these interrelated functions is used, it must be held accountable by criteria which are generic enough to be categories for other more substantive models, the model is then a model for models.

While it was not the intent of this study to reinvent a model, it was necessary for the integrity of the study to have examined the necessity for having a generic model from which to derive accountability models and perhaps more importantly to articulate the criteria for the selection of the particular generic model that formed the foundation for this paper.

A model or structure is necessary as a construct within which the development of accountability as a concept can take place. A model will allow for each component category and each type of accountability to be examined and interrelated in a methodological format.

There are some minimum conditions for establishing a model, in addition to the identification of a model for models. These conditions provide the rules and language for identifying, collating, and evaluating accountability, the rules and language can be used to construct an accountable accountability model.



A. Programs versus Categories

B. Categories versus Variables

Programs
Categories
Categories
Variables

Figure 4. Use of Format for Relating Various Items to be Held Accountable

These other conditions are:

1. The values underlying the model must be shared. That is, assumptions behind a model and the way in which the assumptions are assumed must be recognizable to anyone who utilizes the model.

2. The way in which the categories and variables of a model are defined is also a measure for evaluating a model. Definitions should be stated explicitly in accordance with specific definitional types.

3. The model must have structural integrity. Model integrity means that the model's structure satisfies the minimum canons of science. For instance, the model must be composed of the fewest number categories (parsimony); the components must be related and sequenced in a deliberate way (integrated); and, the model must be able to be duplicated at any time and in any place (duplicability) wherever the definitions and categories are related in the format of the initial model.

4. All models are made up of categories. The way in which the categories are defined and interrelated determines the specific model and its applicability. The categories of a model, in general, represent the areas of activity as exhaustive, necessary, mutually exclusive and determinate.

5. The model should legislate action and not be limited to data collection, measurement, or monitoring. The evaluation criteria developed within the model must be given meaning to activities that accomplish objectives. The criteria, as rules for identifying the accomplishment of activities and objectives, must not be developed apart from the activities and objectives. They must provide the foundation for their own attainment, be agents of their own completion.

It can be expected that any accountability model that is itself to be held accountable must adhere to the rules and criteria stipulated above as ways to evaluate any model. A fundamental condition for any accountability system is that it be a case of itself, i.e., the system itself must be accountable, it must present what it represents. To be held accountable, the system must satisfy a minimum set of criteria used to measure all such systems at each level of its structure. These criteria can be specified by examining the structural demands required of an accountability system.

All accountability systems must adhere to the following criteria:

1. Identification of a model: a system in which the components are arranged for evaluative purposes must place the components in some relationship; e.g., a serial sequence, which would result in a checklist format; an inclusive pattern, which would have evaluation criteria to measure interval relationships of the various components within the system; and contextual-relational format, which would have each evaluation criteria tied to specific components of the system as well as summative evaluation criteria to evaluate the entire system.

2. Model integrity: integrity of the model which demands careful attention to precision, clear criteria, consistency, parsimony, categorical meaning and all the minimum canons of logical rigor.

3. Categorical determinancy: categories and variables where categories are generic classifications that, taken collectively, define the scope or areas in which activities must be completed in order to accomplish a goal or objective.

4. Variables: variables as those areas or topics that must be considered by each category to complete an accountability system.

5. Categorical sequence: sequence of the categories and variables within the model to provide a hierarchical relationship or taxonomic system.

6. Categorical interdependence: interrelatedness of the categories and variables that is accomplished by having the definitions of terms within the categories and variables derived from the "key" terms of the preceding category or variable.

7. Assessability: measurability and shareability of the terms attained by utilizing operational definitions in ostensive patterns.

8. Procedural implementation: procedures for implementing the system so that the system is shareable to the open community in terms of an explicit procedural set of activities or sequences.

Accountability systems, to be systems, must adhere to the basic conditions described above.

CHAPTER 9

ARE AMERICAN MODELS APPLICABLE TO CANADIAN SOCIOLOGY OR SHOULD WE HAVE A CANADIAN SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION?

NORMAN COPPIN

Abstract

This essay briefly examines the characteristics of theory and theory building. It discusses the elements of a theory and the methodology involved in arguing that such and such a theoretical statement is true. It presumes to show that the features of theory and evidence discussed are such that they are constant and not amenable to geographic or demographic influences. It also acknowledges that the term "Canadian sociology" may only mean sociology having to do with Canadian sociological events, but goes on to say that such an argument for a Canadian Sociology of Education is trivial.

It concludes by saying the use of different models is only dependent upon the criteria and theories used to generate them.

Canadian educators from time to time concern themselves with what they take to be an identity crisis in Canadian education. It seems fair to infer from their expressions of concern that these educators believe we Canadians have failed to study and define our educational activities in a uniquely Canadian way. Instead, we have used American models and theories of education to inform ourselves and have thereby missed what we originally intended to learn. I think this is a mistake and the following will explain why.

The topic question as given in the title can be rephrased such that the question is more readily addressed. The rephrased question is, "Are sociology of education models used in America applicable to sociology of education in Canada?" The answer, as this essay will attempt to show, is that there is no way of knowing beforehand.

Some aspects of the nature of sociological theory must be discussed before the above rephrased question can be answered. It will serve our purpose if we concern ourselves with just what a theoretical sociological statement is; what is at least necessary for a theoretical statement to be capable of being justified or shown to be true, as opposed, say, to heuristic.

The enterprise of sociology assumes that societies exhibit regularities, not only static regularities such as societies always contain institutions but also process regularities such as, for example, regularities of appearance, development, and function. It is predominantly these process regularities that sociologists seek to explain. That is, the sociologist seeks to explain certain law-like generalizations.

He wants to explain the generalization because he wants to say the generalization is true, and his explanation, if he has one, will consist of evidence supporting that generalization. The evidence for his generalization, taken as a whole, is a series of one or more events or conditions C, plus a series of one or more hypotheses H, which are related to C and which imply or provide grounds for an inference to a law-like generalization L. Thus it is that an explanation counts as evidence that a statement L is true. Without evidence no sociologist can rationally claim a sociological statement to be true, which is just what he wants to do. If the sociologist has evidence that a statement is true he also has an explanation. If he has an explanation he has followed, at least on empiricist grounds, the logic of the model

$$\begin{array}{l} C \\ \underline{H\quad} \\ L\,. \end{array}$$

It is nonsense to speak of the logic of explanation in the above model being a function of geographic or population peculiarities.

Indeed, it is just explanation being wedded to logic that can make sense of peculiarities, else the peculiarities are just that and unexplainable, because by definition (of peculiarity) no generalizations are available which can be logically deduced from them. To perhaps labour the point, we may be peculiar in Canada and even illogical but we shall never know it unless we can make generalizations L which are logically related to hypotheses H which themselves are derived from and logically related to conditions C, thus providing an explanation and evidence that just such a generalization concerning our peculiarity and illogicalness is true.[1] The case is the same with the American. If we are empiricists the logic of Canadian and American explanations is identical. At least in regard to the model of a logical explanation we do not, I think, want a different Canadian sociology.

Two arguments may be mounted against the foregoing. The first argument is premised upon what it is that can be counted as an explanation in Sociology, and the second is premised upon exactly what it is that is to be explained in Canadian society. We concern ourselves with the first argument. Some sociologists may not accept the structuralist-functionalist (s-f) model of sociological investigation with which the empiricist methodology of explanation is associated. That is, some sociologists may embrace (or tentatively endorse) an "interpretive" or "critical" or "phenomenological" model of sociological explanation, thus seemingly cracking the door open to a uniquely Canadian sociology. However, if one opts to leave the s-f model with its associated methodology of logico-empiricist explanation for, say, an interpretive model of explanation, one has concommittantly decided to view the sociological data differently. This upon examination gets us nowhere because it is meaningless. We are not merely saying that we shall invent a different theory to account for the data, which is acceptable, but that the data themselves are somehow *different*. It is the latter which is meaningless. Given the datum x and the necessarily associated criteria that provides the identity of x and by which we may determine x or not-x, we may only say "x" or "not-x" and cannot say "sort of-(unique)x" as a function of locale. However, having opted to depart the s-f model we may change our requirements for what counts as an explanation, thus making it in some sense uniquely Canadian. For instance we may say that a detailed account *of* sociological phenomena is a detailed account *for* sociological phenomena (cf. Dray, p. 8, 1964). And since Canadian things happen in Canada we will, having given an account *of* it, accounted *for* it, thus having *ipso facto*, achieved a Canadian sociology. Not so. Even if *any* sociological events are in some way unique in themselves we have no extraordinary criteria by which we can know we know them as such. Certainly they cannot be described as such because description involves classifying by general concepts, two such minimal general concepts being "x" and "not-x". Thus this door to a uniquely Canadian sociology is also closed to us.

The second premise upon which an argument that there should be a Canadian sociology (of education) is that "there is something unique about education in Canada (Decore, p. 247, 1977)," i.e., that what it is that is to be explained in Canadian society is different; different things happen.[2] That may be so but it does not follow that there should be a uniquely Canadian sociology. The reader is here referred back to my second response to the first argument. However, Decore may mean simply that there should be a derived body of knowledge concerning Canadians. But this would be, as will be shown shortly, to trivialize the argument. On the other hand, in the absence of a recognizable Canadian sociology, that is a body of sociological knowledge concerning Canadians, one may make a value judgement that there should be such a body of knowledge and then perhaps mount arguments to support that judgement. But it should be noted that if the evidence in support of the argument is used in the methodological model discussed earlier, that is,

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c}C\\H\end{array}}{L}\ ,$$

one is willy-nilly back in the s-f camp of sociological phenomena with all the attending claims on method of argument, criteria for x, and so on.

But to continue with the main argument. What underlies the contention that there should be a sociology which is uniquely Canadian is the belief that somehow the idealizations of Canadian sociological phenomena must be adequately "captured" before they can be investigated or accounted for. That is, in a sense Canadian phenomena must be "canadianly" described. However, no such requirement exists upon which an explanation may be contingent. All that is required for an explanation with respect to data is that the statements concerning that data have a known truth value. This requirement is both wholly different from a requirement such as adequately captured or canadianly described, *and much more simple*. An adequately captured or canadianly described concept may have heuristic value but in the absence of a truth value its logic and hence its explanatory value is nil. Conversely, if a concept has a known truth value nothing else is needed for it to function in an explanation. It seems then that if we have "x is true" we have no need for "x is Canadian."

Continuing with *what* it is that is to be explained Decore (p. 247, 1977) says that Canadian society ought to give rise to content *and* theory (my italics) which is distinguishable from its American counterpart. I concede that the content should or may be distinguishable, since on the face of it some American and Canadian sociological phenomena differ, i.e., some x's may occur in America but not occur in Canada. However, as mentioned above such a disclosure is trivial and hardly an argument for a Canadian sociology (as opposed to a sociology with Canadian content). On the other hand, Decore's use of the term "theory" is ambiguous. Her use of the term admits of one of two possible interpretations. The first possibility is that "theory" is used as a generic term. However, such use would make the remark in which the term in question is used patent nonsense. The structural characteristics of social science theory are precisely the same as those of any other scientific theory. That is, a theory is a set of systematically related statements by which is given an organized account. A theory is a formal system deductively determined. A theory, if fully articulated will provide "an explicit delineation of its primitives, rules, axioms, and deductions (Rudner, 1966)." Precisely what it is in the foregoing description of theory that distinguishes between Canadian and American theory the Americans will be glad to hear. It seems wiser to retreat and say that in the use, and therefore in the resulting expectations, the term "American" or "Canadian" appended to the term "theory" provides no grounds to expect contrasts or nuances in results from theorizing.

The second possible interpretation of Decore's use of "theory" is that the elements (content) of Canadian sociological theory will be distinguishable from the elements (content) of American sociological theory, and it is this use which seems most tolerable in the context of Decore's remark. However, this difference is to be expected among theories and acceptably so among all theories as theories, and thus trivializes her argument. Theories are inventions, products of the imagination, deducted from data n for which there are prior criteria such that there is a definable case of n; and for any given n, n theories are available limited only by the imagination and deductive ability of available theorizers. Thus it is, we have every permission to accept, indeed expect, different theories, not only for different n_x's be they Canadian or American, but also for the *same* n_x. To approach the issue another way, American sociological theory does not, if in fact it does not, apply in Canada because the *theory* does not apply but because we have a case of "not-x" that would make the theory explain. Again we seem to have lost our grounds for a Canadian sociology of education.

One brief intermediate step remains before the rephrased form of the title question can be answered. That step is simply to say that a model is a heuristic device logically related to the theory that generates it. That is, as the theory goes so goes the model.

We may now answer the Question, "Are sociology of education models used in America applicable to sociology of education in Canada?" The answer is, "It depends."

It depends on whether the sociological phenomena have been defined by the same criteria, which is wholly other than saying that Canadian sociology should have different concepts and theories. If different criteria have been used to achieve different x's, different theories may result, hence different models. But it must be remembered that it is manmade criteria that determine whether different models will be used, not supposed ontological reality of the idealizations of sociological phenomena themselves. This is so because theorizers seek by means of criteria to define the concept of the idealization not an ontological essence of a Canadian idealization. So, it depends. It all depends.

Documentations.

1. But then we do not have a "peculiarity" as I have used the term, but a difference.

2. Decore characterizes four distinguishing features of Canadian society and education labelling them (1) Canadian dependency, (2) Pluralism, denominationalism and bilingualism, (3) Provincial jurisdiction over education, and (4) Social stratification and mobility. From these "distinguishing" features she argues, somewhat prescriptively, that Canadian theory of the sociology of education should be distinguishable from its American counterpart, that there should be a unique Canadian sociology of Education.

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CHAPTER 10

MORAL FOUNDATIONS AND MODERN EDUCATION

Neil J. Flinders

In 1929 Walter Lippmann published a book entitled A Preface to Morals. It consisted of two parts. Part I was a lucid and penetrating examination of the contribution the traditional religious perspective had made to the moral structure of society. It was written under the sub-title "The Dissolution of the Ancestral Order." Part II was an equally articulate description of the dilemma modern man faced when he tackled the challenge of replacing the moral foundations Lippmann contended had been dissolved by the "acids of modernity." (p. 8)

Between parts I and II Mr. Lippmann penned three paragraphs which he set apart as a link between his two treatises. He wrote,

> "The upshot of the discussion to this point is that modernity destroys the disposition to believe that behind the visible world of physical objects and human institutions there is a supernatural kingdom from which ultimately all laws, all judgments, all rewards, all punishments, and all compensations are derived. To those who believe that this kingdom exists, the modern spirit is nothing less than treason to God...To the modern spirit, on the other hand, the belief in this kingdom must necessarily seem a grandiose fiction projected by human needs and desires... It follows, then, that in exploring the modern problem it is necessary consciously and clearly to make a choice between these diametrically opposite points of view. The choice is fundamental and exclusive, and it determines all the conclusions which follow." (pp. 143, 144)

Indeed, the classic experience of modern history may well be the "light and sound" drama featuring the echoes of Christianity and the thunder of secularism. Few patterns in civilization have been left unaltered by the influence of this production. Like new wine in an old bottle, the Enlightenment of the 17th Century was more than vestigal Christianity could contain. It burst the vessel and splattered about in undisciplined rivulets. Truth seemed to be at odds with truth, and order and unity appeared only in fragments--here and there. Foundations were obscured, alternatives were increased. The purpose of this paper is to briefly examine these foundations as a basis for evaluating modern education emphases.

VESTIGAL CHRISTIANITY

The evidence is increasingly clear that traditional Christianity, the Christianity of the middle ages and the protestant era, was in fact a vestigal Christianity. A form existed and the form was filled with spiritual echoes, echoes that resonated with the moral nature of man's spiritual sensitivities. These sounds were, however, more like signals than substance in the lives of most Christians. The vitality associated with earlier and ancient revelation was indeed missing. The power, confidence and consistency born of clearly lighted pathways was painfully absent and freely acknowledged.[1] The term Dark Ages seems apropos.

The changes in the Christian Church introduced by the Gnostic movement during the second century seemingly fulfill the Apostle Paul's cryptic warning that prophecy was soon to cease, revelation to stop and truth to slip away from the Church. (I Cor. 13:8) Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Origin and Eusebius among others each acknowledged Gnosticism as a central concern in their writings.[2] The controversy at the heart of this movement was whether true revealed *gnosis* (knowledge) was being replaced with false *gnosis* as proclaimed by the Gnostics--a new order of sophisticated teachers.

Eusebius crystallized this conflict in the early Church with his quote from Hegesippus, one of the earliest Christian writers:

> "Up until those times (says Hegesippus) the church had remained a pure and uncorrupted virgin, while any that were inclined to pervert the sound doctrine of the saving Gospel were still sulking as it were in dark corners. But when the holy quorum of the Apostles had ended their lives in various ways, and that generation passed away of those who had heard the divine wisdom with their own ears, at that moment the conspiracy of godless error took its rise, through the deception of false teachers who, as soon as the last Apostle had departed, first came out openly and hence forward undertook to match the teaching of the truth with what they falsely styled Gnosis."[3]

A. Von Harnack, the German historian, offers an almost shocking comment on what was left of Christianity following the loss of its original power. Beyond some of the practical and sentimental appeal all that remained, he says, was: "*Ein Phlegma*--a sediment, a scum" that possessed little of the original verve and vitality.[4] The change moved the Church away from an unsophisticated simplicity and literalism into an abstract, mystical, spiritualized version of religion. The post apostolic church, as the writings of Clement and his student Origin attest, struggled to provide with reason what the Church had lost through the absence of revelation. Origin, the foremost doctrinal authority of his day, honestly acknowledged that he lacked certainty on many basic religious questions. He did not know the answers nor did he know of anyone who did.[5] Consequently, the living church suffered a serious paralysis, if not a type of death.

Medieval Christianity did have a power, but its power was the power of anticipation. It offered hope, but the hope promised fulfillment, more than it provided fulfillment. The church answered questions, but only up to a point--a point that was exceeded in developments following the 17th Century. Formal religion reflected some consistency, but this consistency did not sustain a theological congruence--neither with the pristine church nor with the body of believers over the centuries. Post-apostolic Christianity was unsuccessful in conveying a sense of constancy amid change. The particular definition for sameness yesterday, today and forever which it adopted failed to accomodate the dynamics of new growth, development and discovery. It was a static rather than a dynamic, a dead rather than a living, definition. The flexibility of continuing revelation which the prophetic church had enjoyed was missing. When Christianity acknowledged that the heavens had been sealed, analyzing artifacts and re-interpreting old revelation was the only wiggle-room it left itself. This proved insufficient as well as unfulfilling. The church as an institution had residual value, but it lacked the vitality to unite its leadership--hence the widely based reform movements of Luther, Calvin, Zwingly and others.

MORAL REMNANTS

One evidence of this inherent weakness is the striking similarity in basic position shared by the prominent adherents of traditional Christianity. This similarity is manifest in the consistent inclination of these individuals to look back more than up--feeling but never quite finding the vitality of the Apostolic period. From the earliest apologists through Augustine and Acquinas to the protesters of the 18th and 19th centuries the ecclesiastical norm was to assume a rearward reach. This similarity in perspective is a subtle and symbolic witness to the inherent weakness of vestigal Christianity, a weakness that was finally manifest in a failure to contain the Enlightenment. With few exceptions the most significant participant observers of Christianity each looked back for the truth. Each seemed to search in the same direction as if pulled by some magnetic force. Instinctively the same bearings appear to be selected in the search to reclaim a vitality it was obvious had once existed. A vitality attested to by ample available evidence, yet which remained distressingly elusive. Fragments of moral truth were there, worthy testaments, glittering like particles of gold dust, mixed in the powder of human history. But gone were the sinews of spiritual flexibility and responsive power. Religion was morally symbolic but spiritually anemic.

Down the stream of centuries came sufficient amounts of these moral fragments to attract attention, to elicit commitment, to promote development--but human spirituality was largely plagued with rigidity. The fundament of the decalogue, the ideal of the Sermon on the Mount and the fervent Pauline appearl for spirituality over carnality were nominally espoused far more than they were inwardly embraced. Christianity appears to have been institutionally enforced more than it was personally generated among the populace. The moral residue was nominally sustaining and for a long time was sufficient to prevail over the available alternatives--until rumors of a new strike came. The news of this new strike, the discovery of light and truth in new fields (some of which contradicted contemporary views) was explosive. Insights from individuals such as Bacon, Copernicus, Galileo and Newton actuated a Renaissance. The subsequent emergence of science stimulated increased action in the echo chamber. Intellectual swellings and social motions created pressures which ultimately burst the bottle. The surging forces moved out in many directions. Dreams and imaginations were excited and the rush to new fields of exploration was on. There was indeed sporadic and frequently inspiring achievement. Man did improve his circumstances in many significant ways. But there was also some unforeseen consequences and casualties. These circumstances proved to be overwhelming. They impacted heavily on an ailing and seemingly impotent church that was set adrift in the propwash of an accelerating materialistic society. Revisiting the Pre-Christian mind created a renaissance, the Reformation broke the bonds of doctrinal authority and the Enlightenment spread new knowledge and perspectives among Western Nations.[6] These forces exerted tremendous influence on people's perception of moral authority.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE NEW URBANIZATION

With the advent of industrialization came a fresh, practical reason for people to gather together in city centers. The modern factory was a new form of production and a new source of employment. The context in which it organized and utilized employees was different than the influence which surrounded the domestic industries that were so common prior to the advent of modern technologies. With the new patterns of production came new outlooks and new definitions.

Alisdair MacIntyre, an English analyst, suggests that the new urbanization which developed in support of modern industry changed the form of community and consequently the allegiance to religion which formerly prevailed in western society. He illustrates his point by noting the fact that the proportionate number of seats available in church facilities compared with area population declines as urbanization increases. In nonurban localities the assumption that church participation will be greater is evidenced by the proportionately larger number of seats per population that are provided in a given community area. He concludes his argument with the observation that,

> "In both the United States and Britain there has been, and there still is, a significant relationship between the size of a given city and the church membership and attendance in that city. In general, the larger the population of a city, the smaller the proportion of church members in the population."[8]

Changing the context in which people lived became the major factor in preparing people to seek answers to life's questions from non-traditional, nonreligious sources somewhat reminiscent of the Isaiahic warning 'Woe unto them that join house to house...till there be no place, that they may be placed alone in the midst of the earth!" (Isaiah 5:8). Western culture was made ready to don its secular glasses--to look in new directions for answers to its questions.

FROM SECULARITY TO SECULARISM

The word secular is derived from the word saecula meaning an age or a period. This description characterizes the trend away from a creator oriented society toward a creature oriented society. Georgia Harkness wrote that "Secularism is the organization of life as if God did not exist."[9] Arnold E. Loen said, "Secularism is being conformed to this world, the world which rebels against the fact that 'from him and through him and in him are all things!'"[10] Gabrial Vahanian published a book in 1957 entitled The Death of God. The first sentence of the preface reads: "Ours is the first attempt in recorded history to build a culture upon the premise that God is dead."[11] These definitions suggest the shift from reliance on a Divine power to reliance on man's power.

At this point, it may be helpful to draw a distinction between secularity and secularism. As truth was manifest in such abundance during the 17th and 18th centuries, many men became recepticles who were not essential figures in the contemporary ecclesiastical structure. Such individuals did not generally credit traditional religion as the source of their new knowledge nor were they particularly interested in establishing a religion of their own. For conventionalists it was a curious and perplexing age; a time when truth was manifest through men quite apart from their affiliation with the traditional religious institution. The saecula or period itself was characterized by men receiving truth outside the religious channels. Hence, the term secular; men could and indeed did come to new and useful knowledge apart from the established religious hierarchy. This was secularity. Whence came the truth was of less concern than that it had arrived.

Later came the notion that men, in and of themselves, did create this new knowledge. Seeing man as the source of his own enlightenment was a separate step. As the tendency to glory in these new achievements increased so did the inclination to take full credit for their origin--leaving not only the churches, but God also out of the picture. This position was eventually institutionalized. All that man needed man could provide, became a doctrine for some. The doctrine, trust in man and man alone, was preached and a "new religion" was born. The religion was secularism. Believing that man does not need God, man only needs man, characterizes the key requirement of adherents to contemporary secularism. Rationalism found this new context a much easier defined and a much less restricted arena in which to function than the theological domain.

Henry Adams clearly captured the essence of this shift in his classic essay "The Virgin and the Dynamo." Attending the World Exposition in 1900 he felt the motions of shifting foundations and shared the impact of this experience: "...he began to feel the forty foot dynamo...much as the early Christians felt the cross...Before the end, one began to pray to it."[12] The giant generator on display at the exposition was for Henry Adams symbolic of the new focus of worship. Power from products made by man's hands was taking precedence over the power that had made man's hands. The machine was replacing the cross as an object of veneration. The urge for worship and security did not diminish but a new avenue for expressing and seeking such feelings did emerge.

FORMS OF SECULARISM

The Enlightenment did not create secularism as it is now known but it certainly accelerated the forces which stimulated a search for new contexts of understanding. And when vestigal Christianity failed to contain the surging forces of new discoveries, various attempts to find alternative housing for these forces occurred. The most pervasively embraced substitute to date has been some type of secularism.

Secularism has appeared in at least three sectarian patterns. Martin E. Marty speaks of these three forms as "utter secularity," "mere secularity," and "controlled secularity."[13] Utter secularism he describes as a formal and unrelenting attack on gods and churches in order to destroy them and then replace them with something else. This seems to be the experience that continental Europe has had with secularism. Mere secularism, Marty says, ignored god and the churches. It made no systematic attempts to replace them but was characterized more by a pattern of coexistence such as that followed in England. Controlled secularism is typified by the response that has been most prominent in the United States. The American pattern was to transform god and the churches so they could embrace and accommodate secularism. Macintyre reflects Marty's observation in his answer to the question: Why didn't industrialization and urbanization displace religious association in America like it did in Europe and England? "The answer is found among the consequences of the fact that American religion has survived in industrial society only at the cost of itself becoming secular. . ." This is illustrated, he says, by "Eisenhower's . . . classical expression, while he was president, when he said, 'Our government makes no sense unless it is founded on a deeply held religious faith, and I don't care what it is!'"[14] The point is clear, though it may not have been Eisenhower's intent.

HUMANISM, A GOVERNOR FOR SECULARISM

Secularism as a substitute for traditional religion was embraced by many as a very desirable friend, if not a personal savior. The evidence of a better present as well as promises of a brighter future, all in the hands of man and not some intangible divinity, was appealing to many people. Jeremy Bentham's invitation to seek legislation that would secure the greatest happiness for the greatest number was attractive. His tendency to define happiness as synonymous with pleasure and pleasure to be whatever each individual considers it to be, readily took root in the soil of a liberal society.

Numerous decades of materialistic secularism, however, did not solve man's problems. New knowledge did come and mankind moved forward on land, sea and in the air. Powers were discovered and harnessed. In numerous ways segments of humanity were liberated from aspects of the temporal elements, from much pain and from some ignorance. But the more man seemed to learn how good things could be the more he seemed to recognize how bad things were. War didn't stop. Death didn't disappear. Suffering didn't diminish. New questions more and more frequently seemed to lead to old questions. The best of times did seem to also be the worst of times.

As secularism moved mid-stream during the last half of the 19th Century and became the center of focus, many critics sounded warnings--sometimes from the shore, more often from the ship itself. Science was becoming oppressive. It began to beat its own drum and march to its own tune. During the 20th Century, more and more passengers became fearful. Secularism is great, yes, but secularism in the form of science only may not be all good. Proclamations in intellectual circles were repeatedly circulated reminding people that it was the study of humane letters--documents of human origin (Greek and Roman messages)--that replaced the study of divine letters (Christian messages) four hundred years ago and that these human letters were concerned about the inner man as well as the outer man--about mind and heart as well as hand and mouth. As the dominant feeling became: Man may not need God, but mankind certainly needs one another in order to survive, secular humanism found its time had come. Secularism needed a conscience--humanism applied for and received the job.

When Edward Royle traced the origins of the British secularist movement in his study Victorian Infidels, he repeatedly acknowledged the ambivalent feelings that surrounded the emergence of a secular society. Many if not most of the early promoters of secularity were in fact some type of conservative, moderate or liberal Deists. The founding fathers of America, for example, were markedly loyal to and supportive of the moral nuggets that reflected their light within vestigal Christianity. "We hold these truths to be self-evident" they write, "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights . . ." (U.S. Declaration of Independence)

The commitment of many of these individuals to create a more free and flexible environment did mark them as non-supportive of much of traditional, institutionalized Christianity. The fact that they could not spare the doctrines of original sin, the depravity and pre-destination of man with the freedoms and equality they desired did cause them to display a non-traditional posture as far as religion was concerned. What is now known as Secular Humanism, however, was not what they espoused. The moral foundations they wanted for society were the moral elements of religion. Morality to them was not Jeremy Bentham's social equality nor his ethical hedonism. Men were to be free, but every man was not to be a law unto himself. Men were to be equal but only in their freedom in the sight of God and of the Law; equal in their duty and responsibility, not in their characteristics, achievements or possessions. Big government was to be feared not fostered.[15]

The secular river seems to have forked several times, not just once, as it flowed from the 17th to the 20th centuries. The original separation from vestigal Christianity was to pursue new light and knowledge. Subsequent channeling, however, has taken it deep into the wilderness of relativism. It seems a tragic loss to toss away the morality that has sustained traditional religion, on the premise that its rituals and doctrines seem incompatible with the fruits of a secular search. To reject the residual morality of Christianity, the Ten Commandments e.g., because the structure in which it was housed fell into disrepute seems folly.

THE CRUX OF THIS PAPER

The illusion of this century may well be that secular humanism can manufacture its own moral foundations or even worse live without any. The moral vitality within traditional religion gave secularity its life. Obviously, it was not the doctrines nor the theology of vestigal Christianity which nurtured and sustained the secular search. But there is evidence to suggest that the moral fragments, the moral echoes of Christianity were energizers that stimulated the creators of the Enlightenment. It is very probable that it was the residual morality from a God-revealed religion that gave men courage to seek new truth, to experience ampathic pain, recognize social hypocrisy, and detest political slavery. Christianity claimed for man a divine origin. Man, therefore, had to be more important than institutions, the cosmos greater than the earth. Here was the basic moral premise, the parent of the fragments which adorned vestigal Christianity.

W.P.D. Wightman, in his meticulous two volume study, Science and the Renaissance, acknowledged the presence of this moral fibre in the pioneers of the Enlightenment as he encouraged a greater effort to research the phenomenon.

> "This enquiry has as yet been two little cultivated. The labor will be immense, but the value of the results might well be commensurable; for they may help reveal how shabby has been the betrayal of those great men of the Renaissance who, while enlarging man's vision of the universe, still regarded it with wonder and awe. To 'modern man' was it left to rob it of all spiritual significance, degrading it and himself to the soulless task of exploitation."[16]

He observed that with all their faults, these men possessed insights and sympathies which modern man has deliberately shunned," and that those who succeeded them selected paths they would probably not have wished man to tread. He urges a re-study of the Renaissance in the hopes it would help reveal a road leading to a nobler prospect than the one that has been followed. The task is urgent "for a consummation threatens in which, in a sense undreamed of by Karl Marx, the expropriators will be expropriated."[17]

Another student of the subject D. J. Wilcox sounds a similar note in his recently (1975) published In Search of God and Self. He points out that the intellectual history of the Renaissance and the Reformation manifested certain values common to both movements: "particularly a heightened awareness of the personal dimensions of life" (preface xi) . . . the men of the Renaissance and Reformation were both unwilling and unable to separate moral and spiritual considerations from practical ones." These movements, Wilcox points out, ". . . boast of no athiests. All thinkers spoke of God with comfort and familiarity to be found in few twentieth-century intellectual circles. But the acceptance of religious language did not prevent some from being anticlerical or from rejecting the teachings of the church."[18]

The most significant moral residue of Christianity was the value it placed on the individual as the spiritual offspring of a personal God. (Gen. 1: 26-27; Jer. 1:5, Rom. 8:16-17; Heb. 12:9) It was this moral fragment that seems to have wittingly and unwittingly fueled free thought during the Enlightenment.

As Walter Lippmann indicated, history suggests that it is mans' acknowledgement of a transcendant and supreme power that enables him to obtain and retain a sustaining morality. Our contemporary evidence strongly infers that secular humanism can never sustain secularity--such is a suicidal connection. Reason cannot sustain reason; only morality can sustain reason. And reason at its best can only hope to clothe and protect morality, not to create it. This premise has significant implication for Modern Education. The story of the development and the declination of U.S. Education in regards to this premise is the subject for another paper. The story of how, as someone said, our cathedrals of learning have become citadels of secularism is a fascinating one. Even more challenging is the search for a solution to the dilemma this has created. Hopefully, we will have the opportunity to pursue that task at another time.

Documentations.

1. A classic example of this is given by John Robison, teacher-pastor of the pilgrim exiles who eventually settled Massachusetts, when he lamented the dismal "state and condition of the Reformed churches" and explained that the condition existed because they could not be drawn to go any

> "Further than the instruments of their reformation. As for example, the Lutherans, they could not be drawn to go beyond what Luther saw; for whatever part of God's will he had further imparted and revealed to Calvin, they will rather die than embrace it. And so also, saith he, you see the Calvinists, they stick where he left them, a misery much to be lamented; for though they were precious shining lights in their times, yet God had not revealed his whole will to them; and were they now living, saith he, they would be as ready and willing to embrace further light as that they had received. Here also he put us in mind of our church covenant, at least that part of it, whereby we promise and covenant with God and one another to receive whatsoever light or truth shall be made known to us from his written word; but to examine and compare it and weigh it with other scriptures of truth before we received it. For saith he, it is not possible the Christian world should come so lately out of such thick antichristian darkness, and that full perfection of knowledge should break forth at once. (William B. Sprague, *Annals of the American Pulpit*, 1857, originally reported by Edward Winslow, member of the congregation living in exile in Holland when the discourse was delivered July 21, 1620.)

2. C. W. VanUnnik et al. *Het Oudste Christendom en de Anticke Cultuur*. Haarlem, Willink and Zoon, 1951, II p. 84.
   H. Nibley, *The World and the Prophets*, Salt Lake City, Deseret Book, 1954, pp. 57-64.

3. Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History* III, 32, 7.

4. Nibley, *Op Cite*, p. 67.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-72.

6. See Will & Ariel Durrant, *The Age of Voltaire*, esp. Chapter 17.

7. *Secularization and Moral Change*, 1967, Lecture 1, pp. 9-36.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

9. *The Modern Rival of Christian Faith*, MCMLII, p. 11.

10. Secularization: Science Without God, 1967, p. xiii.

11. Gabrial Vahanian, The Death of God, 1957, p. xiii.

12. Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams, (Modern Library) New York, Random House, p. 380.

13. The Modern Schism: Three Paths to the Secular, 1969.

14. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

15. Albert H. Long, The American Ideal of 1776, Philadelphia: Heritage Books, 1976.

16. W. P. D. Wightman, Science and the Renaissance, p. 302.

17. Ibid., pp. 302-304.

18. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

SUMMARY

The classic conflict in Western social history has been the rivalry between religion and secularism. The conventional treatment of this topic has been to either defend traditional religion and attack secularism or vice versa. This paper offers a unique interpretation. The thesis is that truth is the central issue and both traditional religion and secularism have fallen short in their efforts to handle truth for humanity.

The historical scenario presented describes traditional religion as a vestigal Christianity--a form filled with spiritual echoes and moral nuggets but devoid of dynamic power and flexibility. The assertion is made that when the church proclaimed the heavens were sealed following the apostolic period, analyzing artifacts and interpreting old revelation was the only wiggle room it left itself. This proved to be insufficient in the face of the Enlightenment. Like new wine in an old bottle, the Enlightenment of the 17th Century was more than vestigal Christianity could contain. It burst the vessel and splattered about in undisciplined rivulets.

The recognition that men could and indeed did come to new and useful knowledge without regard for the church stimulated a new *saecula* or period. Insights from individuals such as Bacon, Copernicus, Galileo and Newton actuated a *renaissance*. People were excited. Whence came the truth was of less concern than that it had arrived. This was secularity.

Secularism came later. The notion that men, in and of themselves, created this new knowledge was a separate step. As the tendency to glory in the new achievements increased so did the inclination to take full credit for their creation--leaving not only church but God also out of the picture. Eventually seeing man as the source of his own enlightenment made an ism out of secularity. It subsequently became institutionalized.

Secularism as a substitute for traditional religion was embraced by many. The evidence of a better present and a brighter future, all in the hands of man and not some intangible deity was appealing to many people. Years of success, however, were followed by years of anxiety and ultimately by years of deep and troubled fear. Not even the enthronement of humanism as an ethical conscience for secularism has succeeded in solving man's problems. New questions more and more frequently seem to lead to old questions. Answers are increasingly more scarce. Ironically, the best of times do seem to be the worst of times.

The fatal mistake is identified as losing touch with the morality that was reposited in traditional religion. The author holds that it was the residual morality from a God revealed religion that gave men courage to seek new truth and to recognize social hypocrisy and political slavery. It was not the doctrines nor theology of vestigal Christianity that gave secularity its life, but the moral remnants therein which matured and sustained the secular search--it was the moral fragments, the moral echoes of Christianity, that energized the creators of the Enlightenment.

CHAPTER 11

NO ONE AMERICAN IDEAL: THE CASE FOR ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF CULTURAL PLURALISM

NICHOLAS APPLETON

I

The requirement that ideas, principles, concepts, and generalizations be clear if they are to contribute to the realization of some product, e.g., social policy, goal statement, curriculum, set of procedures, etc., is well accepted. Thus with respect to cultural pluralism, philosophers of education, such as Green[1], Pratte[2], and Klein[3], along with other theorists, have explicated the concept and established necessary conditions for the label to apply to any given society. Typically these necessary conditions serve as the basis for the construction of some more specific ideal of cultural pluralism capable of directing social affairs. It will be the thesis of this paper, however, that this latter move, inasmuch as it is directed at developing one ideal type is a mistake and undesirable. I shall argue that a two-tier model of cultural pluralism that allows for a plurality of pluralistic models better fulfills the spirit of the established necessary conditions of the concept and better suits the requirements of the United States.

II

There is general agreement that the concept of cultural pluralism requires that at least four necessary conditions be met[4]: (1) cultural diversity must be present within the society; (2) there must be some minimal bond or interaction among the diverse groups, i.e., a common politic; (3) the co-existing groups must share approximately equal political, economic, and educational opportunity; and (4) the society must value cultural diversity and hold cultural pluralism as an ideal. These conditions in themselves, however, are not specific enough from which to deduce social or educational policy or educational curricula. Thus theorists have programmatically offered further guidelines for the construction of an ideal of cultural pluralism. In most cases the undertaking is directed at constructing the ideal best suited for the United States.

The result, of course, has not been the development of one specific ideological position, but rather many[5]. A critique of each of these ideologies with respect to existing social-cultural conditions within the United States, however, suggests that while all have certain advantages each also has certain limitations and that no one is the obvious choice. A brief discussion of three differing positions might serve to illustrate this point.

Several theorists, in rejecting the classical cultural pluralism proposed by Horace Kallen[6] for being overly restrictive and limiting individual mobility, argue for a form of pluralism that may be characterized as voluntary ethnic choice.[7] The emphasis of this ideological position is on the freedom and autonomy of individuals to make of their cultural heritage and identity whatever they desire. In accordance with this position an individual should be allowed to choose to be associated with the interests of a cultural or ethnic group, choose not to be associated at all, or choose some position in between. Here cultural pluralism is not seen as a means either to protect the cultural integrity of groups or to distribute political power and social rewards equitably among different ethnic groups (though there would be no objection to such outcomes).

On the surface this ideal would appear to complement the cultural and ethnic diversity of the United States. In principle it allows individuals to identify and associate with people of similar cultural or ethnic background and to form cohesive social collectives. Alternatively, it also allows people, both as individuals and as members of ethnic cultural groups, to emphasize other factors when presenting themselves in social affairs leaving ethnicity to be a personal and private matter or to define ethnic and cultural background to a position of irrelevancy. Surface appearances, however, are not always a true indication of what lies below. A careful analysis of choice and the social and educational requirements which it entails, I believe, will show voluntary ethnic choice to be hostile to the stated positions of some cultural groups that wish to isolate themselves and/or to successfully transmit their cultural heritage and way of life from one generation to the next.[8]

The incompatability between voluntary ethnic choice and the preservation of a strong ethnic or cultural group is two-fold. One problem area is related to the fact that when we think of choice existing for some individual in a particular context, we normally assume that there are no external restraints blocking the individual from exercising options or forcing the adoption of one position over another. Recognizing this, those advocating the ideal of voluntary ethnic choice have demanded a relaxing of the social barriers that have traditionally restricted the mobility of individuals in society on the basis of ethnic criteria or that have made mobility contingent upon assimilation--a point to the good. But, applying the same principle, advocates of the ideal have also recognized the danger of restrictions emanating from that person's own cultural group. It is here that the first source of potential conflict arises. Groups can only function as political lobbies when they can present themselves as a united front, and if disagreements exist within the group or it appears that because of a lack of solidarity, the group can't make good its threats or promises, the power structure with which it is negotiating need not take it seriously. Thus it is often the case that in order to become a more effective political lobby a group must apply pressure on its individual members to conform. This limits the individual's autonomy and is illegitimate from the standpoint of the ideal of voluntary ethnic choice. While it first appears, then, that the ideal protects the interests of both individuals who choose to collectively assert their ethnic identities and those who choose to minimize their ethnicity, to the extent that the latter exercise their choice the collective is weakened and to the extent that the former exercise theirs, individual autonomy is weakened.

The second conflict between the individual's choice and the stability of the group is rooted in the actual process of making a choice. Besides the absence of possibly limiting external restraints, choice involves the ability of the individual to recognize and consider different alternatives. In recognizing that for choice to be able to occur an individual must be intellectually able to consider various alternatives, we see that individuals must become aware of their own ethnicity because only through such an awareness and understanding does an individual become capable of deciding the meaning these are to assume in his or her life. This requires, within this ideal, an educational curriculum that exposes individuals to a wide variety of experiences, to a questioning and reevaluation of values and beliefs, and to the development of the skills necessary to successfully function in a variety of situations.[9]

But if this type of curriculum leads to greater autonomy for individuals, it also threatens the stability of traditional cultures. The survival of many groups depends upon the ability to transmit the culture--beliefs, values, feelings, customs, etc.--from one generation to the next; to encourage children to question these traditions and to experience alternatives is to invite disaster. It would seem, then, that to adopt an ideal of voluntary ethnic choice for individuals is almost certainly to deny pluralism for some groups. If groups are to have the choice to determine their own destinies, they must be able to ensure a commitment on the part of each successive generation to the group's ways. This will entail a type of enculturation that relies in part on indoctrination, conditioning, and manipulation. Such is the way of cultural transmission.

From the above discussion one might conclude that while strong arguments can be offered for voluntary ethnic choice as the ideal of cultural pluralism, its application is limited. To impose the ideal indiscriminately to all cultural and ethnic groups without regard to their special circumstances would almost certainly do damage to some groups. While autonomy for the individual is preserved in a most satisfactory manner, pluralism for groups, particularly those groups that wish to voluntarily segregate themselves in order to maintain a traditional culture significantly different than the mainstream, is threatened.

Some theorists, I suspect, would not consider this criticism of voluntary ethnic choice to be fatal; they would be willing to tolerate the threat to group stability as an acceptable consequence of increasing individual autonomy. One might argue, for example, that as simple and romantic as the way of life of some of these groups appears to be, the fact remains that the children, because of the parochial nature of their education and the limited nature of outside experiences, lack of the individual freedom and opportunity to choose beyond their culture and thereby limit their potentials as human beings--their destiny is chosen by their parents.

An argument of this type has a certain amount of appeal and logic behind it. Its flaw, I believe, is its failure to recognize that choice is not absolute but always exists in some limiting cultural context. That is, choices are always confined to a limited set of alternatives contained within a particular socio-cultural complex. Given one complex with a particular socio-cultural complex. Given one complex with a particular set of norms, values, expectations, and alternatives, one set of choices will exist; given another complex with a different set of norms, values, expectations, and alternatives, a different set of choices will exist. One cannot be said to be better than the other; they are simply different.[10]

In application to the cultures that may opt for separation we must realize that these cultures and the dominant mainstream culture are self-contained systems, each with their own ontological and axiological perspectives. The Amish may be used as a case in point. For them life is to be simple and directed towards salvation. For the dominant mainstream, individualism, self reliance, and materialism are stressed. Alternatives and choices exist within each system. Amish children, just like children growing up in a middle-class suburb, are free to determine their destinies within the bounds defined by their culture. It is important to note that our particular preoccupation with freedom and choice is itself a manifestation of a cultural value. Thus, when we claim that the opportunities of Amish children are limited, we are speaking from the limited perspective of Protestant tradition and from a particular conception of freedom and of which freedoms are important.

The ideal of *classical cultural pluralism* or insular pluralism that would protect the Amish and other similar groups, of course, can be attacked in the same manner as voluntary ethnic choice only this time with the emphasis on limitations to individual autonomy. Because of the closed nature of groups resulting from this ideological position, mobility for individuals outside their groups is limited both by constraints imposed by their own group and by the unaccepting attitudes of other groups. This is clearly in contradiction to the stated goals of groups such as White Ethnics and Blacks, many of whom seem to support a position of modified cultural pluralism.

The ideal of *modified cultural pluralism* places a much greater emphasis on a common culture held among the diverse groups in society and on interaction between members of different groups than does classical cultural pluralism. Groups maintain a certain degree of distinctiveness but also see themselves as belonging and contributing to the larger American culture and society in a significant way. In the political-social-economic arena, individuals are represented and lobby as group members, each group getting its fair share of social rewards.

But if modified cultural pluralism is appropriate for some there are others that seem not to fit the ideal at all. We have already discussed the groups requiring greater autonomy and segregation such as the Amish. Others may find it too confining. Members of some groups, for example, tend to avoid representing themselves or lobbying as a special interest group, preferring to assume a low profile and either compete in the marketplace as individuals or find support among themselves. Many Japanese have taken this position.

The ethnic group popularly known as WASPs also seems to stand in opposition to modified cultural pluralism. One of the characteristics of this group, is that its members tend to define other people as "ethnic" but to refrain from applying the label to themselves. They prefer to think of themselves as individuals and define their identity on the basis of class and status variables such as occupation, education, and income and on the basis of other personal achievements and concerns. With this frame of reference, cultural heritage should be strictly a personal and private matter, and individuals entering the socio-political arena should do so as members of special interest groups formed around social issues, not on the basis of ethnic heritage. Thus, though WASPs in many ways act as an ethnic group, if they supported pluralism at all, they would be more inclined to a more open form than modified cultural pluralism.

III

Our brief analysis of the appropriateness of several alternative ideological models of cultural pluralism for American society appears to leave us in a problematic position. Each of the alternatives seems reasonable when viewed in a particular context and applied to a limited set of groups, but at the same time no one model seems able to accommodate the requirements of all the groups. The reason for this is that not only is there a diversity of cultural groups in the United States but there is a diversity of kinds of groups. That is, while groups can be identified and distinguished on the basis of national origin, they can also be identified and distinguished on the basis of their behavioral (cultural) and structural assimilation, geographical segregation and integration, residential segregation and integration, social class (i.e., those groups that share in the economic and political rewards of society as opposed to those groups that are effectively excluded from these rewards), social and cultural goals, or some combination of these qualities. Since ideological are in part designed to meet the perceived needs of some particular group in some particular socio-cultural context, these differences contribute to the development of alternative ideologies that have limited application.

With how serious of a problem are we now left? The fact that a number of models competing for prominence in the United States exist may lead to an overall weakening of the movement for cultural pluralism. Resources otherwise earmarked for the general support of the movement may be diverted inwards as alternative positions compete against each other. Similarly, the divisions that may result from an internal struggle may render any one position incapable of mustering enough strength to make itself felt in social policy. Finally, when there is internal dissension it is generally much easier for those hostile to the ideal to avoid considering it seriously. Citing the confusion within, opponents may claim that advocates themselves don't know what they want and thus the issue is not worthy of serious consideration.

But these undesirable consequences need not follow. Indeed the diversity of models may be an asset. In order for the ideal of cultural pluralism to be of greatest benefit to society, it may well be that we do not need and should not seek one specific ideological model. Each of the alternative positions being considered, though they differ in regard to specifics, is consistent with the general concept as established by the four necessary conditions and thus all have a common basis of agreement. By recognizing that each specific alternative may be appropriate to some social contexts and set of groups but not to all, we can avoid viewing the alternatives as competitors and hence can preserve their common bond and mutual commitment. By proceeding in this manner we can avoid the potential dangers of internal strife while retaining the benefits of having specific ideological statements. Further, by allowing for a plurality of ideological models we are able to avoid the limitations inherent in adopting any one particular position. Thus, we are theoretically able to acknowledge and respond to the needs and wishes of the different types of groups in society. By so doing we create a much richer form of pluralism than would otherwise be possible. In effect, we have a two-tier pluralism--a pluralism of pluralism, if you will--a plurality of models of pluralism each legitimate in its own right and potentially appropriate to some group or set of groups in society.

Let us assume that theoretically this two-tier pluralism for which we are arguing is sound. The question remains, however, if such a model can be applied in practice. The central challenge will be in determining which specific models should be applied to which specific groups or types of groups and under what conditions.

Consistent with the nature of ideological positions, it will be likely that some advocates within various positions will argue that their own model should be universally applied. Undoubtedly the enthusiasm of these persons will be grounded in the genuine belief that their position is in the best interests of both society and all the individuals it will affect. We might also expect that some individuals will be willing to allow for a plurality of models to operate but will wish to specify that one and only one model is appropriate to a particular group or group type. That is, an individual may be willing to concede that groups like the Amish and Hutterites should be allowed to adopt a policy of classical cultural pluralism but believe that the model to govern policy relating to all ethnic minorities, Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians in particular, should be a form of pluralism entailing integration. Thus, despite the contrary wishes of some parents or local communities, because the advocate believes it is in the best interest of society this model will be imposed on all members of the relevant groups. In the same fashion, some may wish to impose separatism for all Blacks. (Some Black theorists have taken this position)[11]. A tendency to move in this direction may in part result from the recognition that if a group is to function effectively as a political interest group, it must maintain a high degree of cohesiveness; to allow different segments of an ethnic community to go their separate ways is to weaken the power base of the whole.

All of the positions taken above have one common flaw: they all violate the spirit of pluralism. If pluralism as a general ideal is good for society as a whole, it must also be good for the individual groups in society and must be retained in the application of its more specific ideological alternatives. It will not do to replace a dogmatism or authoritarian system for another no matter how laudatory its principles sound. Hence, to adopt one species of pluralism and impose it on all groups or any one particular group or set of groups is inconsistent with the condition of pluralism that requires that a diversity of positions be valued. This condition would also seem to imply that the individuals affected should have considerable say in the decision, since the ideal of pluralism presupposes that the diversity within society is a result of the wishes of the constituent groups. In other words, to value diversity in society is to value the freedom that allows diverse groups to define the nature of their own being.

Our position, then, is that each group or subgroup (e.g., community) should be the primary determinant of which idealogical model of pluralism best suits its goals and social situation. The adoption of this approach would reinforce both democracy and pluralism, the two core values this country currently claims to espouse. Within this model, our approach to different groups will most likely vary from situation to situation. Social policies regarding the native peoples living in areas geographically isolated from highly integrated post-industrial cosmopolitan areas will probably differ from those regarding groups more closely tied to the "mainstream" society. Similarly, policies regarding members of one ethnic group in a particular community may vary from the policies regarding members of the same ethnic group in another community. It will be impossible beforehand to predict the mosaic that will eventually develop, assuming of course that one is allowed to develop.

While self-determination will play an important role in the development of social policy, it must be clear that this will not be the only operative variable. Obviously, we live in an interdependent society where the actions of one group affect the well-being of many others. Such a society cannot exist if the possible range of alternative actions of any particular group is not limited to those that will not cause serious harm to society or undermine the principles on which it is founded. The determination, then, of the ideological model to govern the social policies toward some particular group must be evaluated in light of the larger social context in which the group exists. Though the desires of the group demand considerable respect, ultimately the decision must rest on some higher authority, and the principles on which the higher authority will base its judgment will be those found in the social ideals of democracy and cultural pluralism. This said, however, we must realize that while there is a danger in allowing too much autonomy for individual groups, a greater danger probably exists in our overzealous efforts to protect society by dominating and repressing culturally different groups. Certainly this has been the case historically.

If there is an underlying theme to govern multicultural education in particular or education in a multicultural society in general it is this: Currently there is a search for the "real" meaning of pluralism or at least for a model capable of resolving conflict and debate within the movement. If the spirit of pluralism is to be followed, we should expect to develop not one national model but rather a number of regional and local models that meet the needs of various groups.

Documentations.

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2. Richard Pratte, "The Concept of Cultural Pluralism," *Philosophy of Education, 1972: Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society*, pp. 61-77.

3. J. Theodore Klein, "A Pluralistic Model for Educational Policy Making," *Educational Theory*, Vol. 28, No. 2, (Spring 1978), pp. 85-89.

4. These conditions are set down most clearly by Pratte and Green. Klein actually lists six conditions, all of which I believe are within the parameters of the analyses of Pratte and Green.

5. For an example of some of the ideological alternatives that can be found in the literature, see Nicholas Appleton, *Multicultural Models for a Pluralistic Society*, Washington, D.C.: Teacher Corp., 1980.

6. The writings of Horace Kallen generally support this position. See *Culture and Democracy in the United States*, N.Y.: Boni and Leverright, 1924, and Spencer J. Marcy, "Horace Kallen's Two Conceptions of Cultural Pluralism," *Educational Theory*, Vol. 29, No. 1, (1979).

7. This position is argued for by: J. Theodore Klein, "A Pluralistic Model for Educational Policy Making," *Educational Theory*, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 85-89; Michael Novak, "Cultural Pluralism for Individuals," *Pluralism in a Democratic Society*, Melvin Tamins & Walker Plotch (eds), N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1977, pp. ; Andrew Greeley, "On Ethnicity and Cultural Pluralism," *Change*, Summer 1975, pg. 4.

8. The Amish, Hutterites, and Mennonites are clear examples of such groups. Native-American, Chinese-American, and Mexican-American groups have also taken this position.

9. For a discussion of the possibility of choosing an ethnic identity and the curriculum requirements which may facilitate such a choice see Nicholas Appleton, "Free Choice and Ethnic Identity" unpublished paper, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. 1980.

10. This is not to say that some cultures are not more restrictive or confining than others, especially toward different people within their boundaries, or that we endorse a complete sense of cultural relativism. These are separate issues. Rather, the point is that different cultural systems must be seen as parallel to each other if we are to avoid comparing apples and oranges.

11. See, for example, Barbara Sizemore, "Separation: A Reality Approach to Inclusion," Racial Crisis in American Education, Robert Green (ed.), Chicago. Fallett Educational Corporation, 1969, pp. 249-279.

CHAPTER 12

FAILURE--OFTEN A RESULT OF CONTRADICTION

JOHN B. CONNELY

I
INTRODUCTION

Many claim that there is massive failure connected with the public schools. Businessmen, the military and the academic community complain about declining reading scores, math skills and SAT scores. Law schools feel they have to establish remedial reading classes. Colleges feel compelled to offer high school level or even junior high school level math and English courses, while high schools may have to offer elementary level courses.

A variety of causes are often pointed out. There is supposed to be occurring a collapse of moral values in general. The church and family are disintegrating. Future shock is with us and the pace is accelerating. Transiency has become a way of life. Our materialistically oriented society has come to eschew the values which supposedly underlie effective schooling and learning. And, last, but not least, there has come to be a Darwinian selection of the most unfit as teachers, administrators, and, of course, professors of education. Indeed, G. B. Shaw would have us believe that there are even distinctions to be made among the unfit. His dictum has become so well known that many can paraphrase it without the least idea of who said it or where it can be found. For "He who can, does. He who cannot teaches."

Failure, however, is often not a simple, clearcut issue. It is usually not just a question similar to whether an engine runs or not. In an evaluation of social institutions, it is significantly a question, first of all, of expectations and of perceptions. For, if expectations are too high, too vague or the goals overvalued--in terms of other, also desirable, goals--a perception of failure may arise, when in reality the institution may be functioning well enough--given the ambiance in which it exists and must function.

In a subtler sense, moreover, our very goals--even when they themselves are clear cut and reasonable when viewed in a myopic way, may contain such inherent contradictions that failure is built in to the very warp and woof of our enterprises. Such contradictions may arise from the effort to implement a particular, specific belief, or from the effort to implement a variety of popular and/or legal demands. For it is all too common to seek a given goal without realizing or being willing to accept the consequences of that search. And those consequences may be very different from what was originally intended.

II
SOME PERSONAL CONCERNS

Now it is reasonable to want bright, academically qualified people as teachers. We want college graduates that know their subjects and are talented people. It is also reasonable to try to keep costs down. It is not reasonable, however, to expect to get and keep highly qualified people--with exceptions to be sure--given relatively low pay for beginning teachers, e.g., $13,000, and pay scales which are not keeping up with inflation. This is especially true for certain fields, such as math and science. Thus, we have a contradiction. The consequences of our behavior contradict our intentions.

Assuming we locate such people, however, or reasonable facsimilies, it seems reasonable that appropriate and authentic learning will take place. Often, however, these people are asked to teach what amounts to extremely heterogeneous remedial classes. There is generally a tremendous overlap even in what might be called normal classes. So much so that in a given 7th. grade class it is not unusual to have students ranging from 5th. to 9th. grade in reading or any other skill. In fact, it is not unknown to have students ranging from kindergarten to college level in the same class. Thus, lesson planning, the selection of texts, the writing of valid tests and effective teaching in any sense all become extremely difficult.

In many situations it is as if a talented, motivated person is hired to teach high diving. Indeed, he or she may also be provided with a 10-meter platform, an Olympic sized pool and elaborate shower and locker facilities. This teacher is then given a class composed of young people who range from aquaphobics to rank beginners to--a few--who are outstanding divers and perhaps do not need the class at all. Discipline difficulties arise as teaching and learning problems together with significant transiency and many housekeeping chores create a job that is simply beyond the capacity of almost anyone. Teachers are given great responsibility and saddled with unrealistic expectations, yet are allowed very little if any authority or control over the conditions with which they must cope.

To protect our teachers so that they can do their job to the best of their ability, we have had passed various tenure laws. Often they are desperately needed. Teachers used to be regularly laid off to keep salaries down. There were unreasonable restraints put on their right to live where they wanted to, dress as they felt appropriate, and teach what they felt was the truth. But such laws have made it very difficult to exercise any managerial control, because, as in the civil service, it has become so difficult to get rid of someone that the threat to do so does not have much credence. Yet what if someone should not have been hired in the first place? Perhaps a mistake was made or the principal was desperate to put a live person in charge of a class? What if the specialty of the person is no longer needed? Is work to be found, whether the person can do it adequately or not? What if the teacher allows himself to get so out-of-date that the teaching function is seriously impaired? What if the teacher gradually ceases to be effective for other reasons? Where are the boundaries of the rights of an employee vs. those of the students and society? Can we protect people beyond reasons? Indeed, might not the effect of doing so actually eventuate in many people not being motivated to keep doing as well as they could? What has come about is often a general attitude of "we must accept, live with and work with what we have." The tenure laws which were created to protect teachers so that they could do a good job have helped create a situation where some teachers are protected so that they can do a poor job indefinitely--often at the top of the salary scale.

We have established lay councils of parents to help garner support for our schools, to get a better understanding of the needs and attitudes of the community and to hopefully give such people a feeling of participation. Yet the time which can be consumed by meetings is potentially enormous and productivity may be elusive at best. It is often most difficult to establish whether the people on the committees are really reflective of the community. Such people often need extensive education as to the laws governing the schools and the possibilities of change and control which are allowable. The councils may have a high absentee rate and individual members may not be able to or want to continue beyond a year--then the whole process may have to start all over again each year. What started out as a method to help the schools may end up by being another detriment to better education.

We have a strong belief in the local control of education as the best means of serving the community. School boards are to be elected locally so as to reflect local needs and view points. They are to be filled by lay people who will have a broader perspective than the professional school staff. Yet often local needs are a myth. We are a national society--seemingly forever on the move. The needs of children in Alabama may very well be essentially similar to the needs of children in Alaska or California. Many board members, in our more than 30,000 school districts, do not have or do not take the time to understand the issues. Often they have no thought-out philosophy of education or perhaps even a non thought-out one. As local institutions, the boards are open to immediate pressure groups or the most vociferous advocates of whatever fad seems currently necessary to protect freedom, the Republic or the American Way. Thus, an institution developed to serve the community may serve it poorly.

School boards function partly by choosing and placing faith in a superintendent, who in turn has a staff and a group of principals. These are the experts who will guide our fleet and captain our ships. But such an analogy is quite misleading for it assumes that there are clear, consistent educational goals and that these people are chosen for their skills in helping society achieve them. People who often get such leadership positions, however, are chosen for a wide variety of reasons and abilities. It may have been chance. Who was available at the time? They may have skills in budget matters. They may exhibit adequacy in interpersonal relations. They may be leaders in sports activities. They may be a compromise to placate community racial/ethnic groups. They may have shown a proclivity to be able to work with the system. They may reflect the biases of the selection committees. None of these factors are necessarily bad, but none of them make a person necessarily or even probably an appropriate leader or member of an institution putatively concerned with learning. In fact the majority of such people whom I have met are not academically inclined people at all--if by this is meant someone who enjoys and pursues intellectual matters. They tend to function much as administrators of a typical business might. They follow guidelines, hand in reports on time and implement policy. Now whether much of this activity has much relevance to education is often open to question. A "good" administrator is one who does such a job well. He or she in the short or long run may have very little effect on what goes on in the classroom.

III
SOME CURRICULUM/TEACHING CONCERNS

Given a high degree of mobility, historical fear of centralized control and the need for every teacher to adjust the curriculum to his/her classes, it is reasonable to have each teacher develop a curriculum and appropriate standards within a general framework provided by the State and the school district. But in reality the consequence is that teachers literally (within extremely wide latitudes) make their own curriculums and set their own standards. We are unable, with any assurance, to ascertain that students have covered (let alone learned) the supposed material in a given curriculum. Grades have long since lost almost any semblance of meaning in a comparative sense outside of perhaps the particular class itself in which the grade was given. Unless the subject, e.g., math, rigidly enforces an external framework, classes become isolated beads on a string. Our effort to provide flexibility has helped create a non-system which sometimes seems to resemble Brownian movement more than a coherent, thoughtful social institution.

It is desirable to have electives and a variety of social activities. We should strive to meet the diverse needs of youngsters. But to the extent that learning requires sequential, developmental effort, there may be little growth occurring. What maturing takes place may be largely a function of exposure, growing older and societal influences outside of the school. The school may be doing little to actually foster intellectual growth as an institution--although particular teachers may be doing all they can as individuals. Interesting exceptions to a poor quality of learning may be such situations as varsity athletics, music and advanced shop classes. They are interesting examples because they demonstrate what authentic learning requires--clear focus, motivation, repetition, adequate feedback, reinforcement, a clearly understood and pursued developmental line and the clear perception of gestalts which serve as the subgoals and goals toward which student and teacher behavior are focused and by which standards are generated and methods vindicated. Instead of this many of our students are swimming in a sea of electives which require no prerequisites and terminate at the end of the semester. They have little beginning, nor end. And what is between the two is often seemingly indeterminate.

Our schools seem often to resemble a cafeteria. Nutritional food is available, but no one has to take much, let alone be forced to consume anything in particular. And, even if someone does choose something nutritional, he or she doesn't have to continue to do so for long enough to really build a strong body. To be sure, some--for a variety of reasons--do get various degrees of training and education from the experience, but it is largely up to the individual student. Thus a system which was forged to provide maximum opportunity, does so--by allowing many, in some cases a great many--to have the opportunity to do very little.

It is also desirable to have graduation standards for high school. The Hart Bill should help bring about such a situation. Yet districts may vary in their requirements. These requirements can soak up funds in necessitating staffing for remedial classes, staffing that must be taken from the regular programs. If the standards are at all what many educated adults would consider reasonable, you would most likely have massive failure. But an attendance diploma cannot be given, so one must graduate the students or push them out with no diploma or certificate at all. The numbers failing, if the standards were very high, could easily be far beyond what is politically acceptable. There is no known way to have the typical American comprehensive high school (let alone those in lower-class slums) turn out average students who do genuine high school level work of a high caliber--although there may be great difficulty in getting agreement on what genuine high school level work of a high caliber means.

A distinctive aspect of American education has been our penchant for "objective" testing. Aside from the problem of the subjectivity involved in writing and selecting the questions, it all seems very reasonable. Objectivity is one of the American virtues. Being machine gradable makes the whole process up to date and progressive, time saving and efficient. Here we have a cornucopia of virtues. Yet objective testing is prone to the worst combination of rote memorization and elimination type guessing. It does not matter much what academic textbook writers claim on the subject, the entire tenor of learning in America is being set by a type of testing which does not require or even encourage either writing skills or the intellectual ability to put more than two thoughts together at a time. It really encourages students to largely confuse *knowing* with being able to puzzle out what probably is not the wrong answer from a numerated list. What at best is a marginally important skill has become the overwhelming focus of much of our public education. Starting with good intentions, we again have created problems.

IV

SOME PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS

We have clearly espoused compulsory education. For theirs and society's sake, all children should have a basic education (although we seem to have become unclear what we mean by that). We do need to protect children from unenlightened parents, rapacious employers and from their own lack of motivation. The consequences, however, of 12 required years of attendance are often boredom, antipathy and hostility. Many younsters don't see the point of it at all, don't want it, won't take it and make a nuisance of themselves. Others apparently simply can't absorb it. Meanwhile we have altered the programs and standards for masses of young people. Many of these young people could probably have done better work and learned more, if it had been expected and required. Our good intentions have not saved many who consider our schools prisons, compulsory education a form of servitude and teachers as guards to be outwitted. These same good intentions have often, equally unfortunately, resulted in average and above average students receiving, at best, a mediocre education. We have decided as a society that Jefferson's idea of a school system that would strive to educate those who were educable is unacceptable. We have decided that it is better to try to give everyone a little education whether they want it or not.

To make the comprehensive high school a reality we had to adopt the policy of social promotion. Besides, it was deleterious to the social/psychological growth of children to hold them back. It was and is an affront to our belief in equal rights and the equality of people--to fail students. Yet here is the nexus of many of our contradictions. What kind of a curriculum is appropriate for an average spread of students ranging from 6 to 10 years in a 7th. grade class? What kind of teacher can teach such a class well? How can any person motivate all learners in such circumstances? What are we to do with masses of young people who are neither very interested in academic nor vocational goals, but are simply putting in their time and growing up (we hope)? We may have no better answer than the warehousing of many of our youth, but it is not reasonable to expect teachers to develop high levels of academic excellence for large numbers of their students under the prevailing circumstances.

These contradictions are woven into our most fundamental beliefs. We want to achieve equality and quality. The Jeffersonian--Jacksonian tension is an ever present reality. Yet the harder we try to educate everyone, the less we seem able to highly educate our talented, or reasonably educate the average students. We go 'round and 'round. Quality requires, no, necessitates, standards, motivation, native ability and hard work. These bring about selection--but selection mitigates against equality.

V
CONCLUSIONS

Our built in contradictions bring about failure. We want to accomplish contradictory goals, therefore we both perceive ourselves as failing, and we do fail. We cannot eliminate contradictions. They can be fruitful, are ever present and reflect the nature of social circumstances. But they can get beyond our ability to cope with them. Increasingly we are losing a consensus, a sense of accepted general values, a sense of balance. The result is paralysis, a lack of direction and fractionalization. Our contradictions are getting out-of-hand.

The problem of contradictions leads to an argument for reduced and simplified expectations, which is currently becoming a somewhat fashionable view. It is fashionable, unfortunately, often because it is believed that reduced expectations will lead to reduced costs. There are reasonable, simplified expectations which school systems and schools should be held to. These expectations, however, won't necessarily involve less time, less money or less effort.

There is no inherent reason why school programs must fail. Teachers and administrators are no less competent than anyone else. The proper response to the perceived failures of the public schools is not to abandon the idea of public schooling which has served us so well for so long, but to formulate reasonable expectations, provide reasonable resources and authority and to hold the public school systems, then, strictly accountable for performance.

What these reasonable expectations would be, would--of course--be the subject of a great deal of possibly acrimonious debate, but surely the majority of parents would argue for schools that are clean, safe and adequately disciplined. Beyond that most parents would still agree that students should be able to adequately read, write and compute. For those young people who aspire to a college experience there may be an adequate consensus for mathematics, science, foreign languages, etc.

But some current expectations must give way if a solution is to be found. I suggest it will have to be in those areas where the schools have increasingly been expected to socially, economically, academically and psychologically salvage youngsters who, for whatever reasons, have difficulties significantly beyond those of average children. Our schools should be held strictly accountable for giving normal, average children the best education they can absorb. Other expectations, whether those of job security or of a utopian social order, should not be allowed to stand in the way of schools that, however modestly, do work.

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